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PARALLEL STATE
Gregory Dolin † & Irina D. Manta †

Alternatively glamorized and reviled, Rio de Janeiro’s shantytowns, known as
“favelas,” have become a fixture of the city’s architecture and life. It is estimated that
about 1.5 million people reside in these informal settlements that are scattered in the
center and outskirts of Brazil’s second-largest metropolitan area. Operating in the
shadow of the law and lacking formal ownership title, favela residents have
constructed an intricate set of informal rules to buy, sell, rent, and bequeath property
that is often administered by the residents’ associations of individual neighborhoods,
which also assist in mediating related conflicts. While largely untested legal
mechanisms may now exist in some favelas to obtain title, obstacles such as the cost
to do so as well as ignorance of the legal system—combined with a relative reliance
on the current informal scheme of acquisition and dispute resolution—stand in the
way of residents’ achieving formal ownership. This Article argues that while the
informal framework has proved fairly efficient at managing everyday life in the
favelas, the large-scale removals that the government has implemented in Rio de
Janeiro in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games have
upset the balance. Due in part to individuals’ lack of legal title, the government has
been able to apply a high degree of discretion over the conditions under which it has
exercised its eminent domain power, including when it came to deciding which
abodes would be taken, what level of compensation people should receive, and how
favela residents would be relocated. This Article shows how even robust extralegal
frameworks can lull people into a false sense of security about their rights, which
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governments may exploit to dispossess the poor and vulnerable when it is politically
desirable to do so. This should serve as a renewed call to simplify the titling process
for individuals and interrogate the forces that oppose it.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2016 Olympic Games (Games) in Rio de Janeiro were mired in
controversy. With less than two months to go until the Games, the State
government declared a “state of public calamity” over the financial crisis
that plagued the region. 1 The event was under potential threat by
militant Islamists. 2 The outbreak of the Zika virus, whose devastating
effects include potential microcephaly in babies, motivated numerous

1 Donna Bowater, Rio Declares ‘State of Calamity’ amid Cash Crisis that Could Threaten
Olympics as City Hospital Forced to Close Doors, TELEGRAPH (June 17, 2016, 11:41 PM), http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/17/rio-declares-state-of-calamity-amid-cash-crisis-aheadof-olympic.
2 Brazil Sees Rising Threat from Isil Ahead of Rio Olympics, Intelligence Agency Says,
TELEGRAPH (Apr. 16, 2016, 1:49 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/16/brazilsees-rising-threat-from-isil-ahead-of-rio-olympics-intell.
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experts to call for moving or delaying the Rio Olympics. 3 It is telling that
the problem is considered minor in comparison with some much
higher-frequency events—a woman is ten times more likely to be raped
than catch Zika in Rio de Janeiro, while men are more likely to be shot
to death. 4 Even the construction of the facilities themselves appeared to
be in a state of disarray only shortly before the planned start of the
festivities. 5
While the long-term effects of holding the Olympics in Rio de
Janeiro will remain unknown for some time, a significant number of
individuals have already had their lives uprooted by them. This is
especially true of the thousands of people who were forcibly removed
from their homes to make place for construction for both the Olympics
and the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The exact number of persons affected
remains in contention. One report claims that at least 4120 families had
lost their homes due to the Olympics by 2015, which may have
engendered the effect that “thousands of children have been displaced
and left—at least temporarily—unable to access education, healthcare
and other social services.” 6 According to government figures, a total of
22,059 families were removed in Rio between 2009 and 2015, for a total
of about 77,206 individuals. 7 The City government claims, however, that
only a few hundred of these families were relocated due to the Olympics,
namely in the favela, or shantytown, of Vila Autódromo that borders the
main Olympic Park. 8 The removals in that area led to violent clashes
between inhabitants who refused to leave and law enforcement, even

3 Agence France-Presse, Olympics in Rio Should Move Due to Zika Concerns, Say 150
Experts, TELEGRAPH (May 27, 2016, 9:49 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/05/27/
olympics-in-rio-should-move-due-to-zika-concerns-say-150-experts.
4 Vanessa Barbara, Brazil’s Olympic Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/opinion/sunday/brazils-olympic-catastrophe.html.
5 See id. At one point, officials even lost the keys to the Olympic Stadium. See Daniel Tran,
Rio Officials Lose Keys to Olympic Stadium, YAHOO! SPORTS (Aug. 4, 2016, 4:09 AM), http://
sports.yahoo.com/news/rio-officials-lose-keys-to-olympic-stadium-080908840.html.
6 Jonathan Watts, Rio Olympics Linked to Widespread Human Rights Violations, Report
Reveals, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 11:43 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/
08/rio-olympics-2016-human-rights-violations-report.
7 COMITÊ POPULAR DA COPA E OLIMPÍADAS DO RIO DE JANEIRO, MEGAEVENTOS E
VIOLAÇÕES DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS NO RIO DE JANEIRO 20 (2015), http://
www.childrenwin.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Dossie-Comit%C3%AA-Rio2015_low.pdf.
8 Bruce Douglas, Brazil Officials Evict Families from Homes Ahead of 2016 Olympic Games,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/28/brazilofficials-evicting-families-2016-olympic-games; see also RIO PREFEITURA, EXPLAINING RIO DE
JANEIRO HABITATIONAL POLICY 3–4 (2015), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B1x0_
cNhKxbDb094M1hraGVNekU/view?pref=2&pli=1 (arguing that the sports events-related
removal figures are inflated).
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though Rio’s mayor had initially promised that there would be no forced
relocations. 9
As this Article discusses, the removals of politically powerless
individuals to make way for construction projects for the Olympics and
World Cup are only the latest in a long series of removals that favela
residents have suffered. Theirs is a story that—while infused with the
travails of South American politics—also contains the elements of
adverse possession and eminent domain that resonate with those
familiar with the American legal system. While favela residents have
built a rich informal property system around their way of life to buy,
sell, and facilitate the inheritance of their homes and businesses, this
Article argues that their lack of individual title stands in the way of full
legal recognition of ownership by the government. When events such as
the Olympics or World Cup motivate the state to engage in large-scale
architectural planning that includes the exercise of eminent domain, the
absence of title allows the government to seize land and disburse
compensation at its discretion. Favela residents technically now have
legal access to adverse possession and other means to obtain title after
having lived in the same homes for a long time, but the arcane and
complex mechanisms to which they are forced to resort effectively
prevent them from accomplishing this and keep them at the
government’s mercy. Rather than helping individuals to change their
legal situation, a number of entities such as favela residents’ associations
refuse to provide support in this battle because they believe that this
would reduce their own power, and a number of other individuals and
groups fear that individual title would lead to gentrification and a
breakdown of existing communities. This Article argues that title is
likely a necessary tool for favela residents to obtain autonomy and for
Brazil to fulfill its potential in the area of economic development.
Part I traces the historical development of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas
from early settlements to large-scale neighborhoods that house millions
of people. Then, Part II describes the property laws that govern Rio,
including zoning regulations and relevant administrative procedures.
Part III explains how favela residents currently transfer their homes and
businesses in the informal economy and what obstacles stand in the way
of a titling system. In Part IV, the Article analyzes how the lack of title
has contributed to the government’s ability to engage in takings for
9 Jonathan Watts, Forced Evictions in Rio Favela for 2016 Olympics Trigger Violent Clashes,
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015, 5:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/03/forcedevictions-vila-autodromo-rio-olympics-protests; see also Michael Powell, Officials Spent Big on
Olympics, but Rio Natives Are Paying the Price, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/15/sports/olympics/rio-favelas-brazil-poor-price-too-high.html?_
r=0 (discussing removals in several neighborhoods of Rio).
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sports events arbitrarily and without having to provide specific levels of
compensation. This Part also suggests improvements to the current
framework that would facilitate the creation of a robust titling system.
The conclusion follows.
I. THE HISTORY OF RIO DE JANEIRO’S FAVELAS
During Portugal’s occupation of Brazil, the country had a sesmaria
system that distributed property to promote agriculture and
colonization. 10 The land was subject to a series of conditions such as
limits on the land’s occupation and restrictions on its use to certain
economic activities. 11 The sesmaria could be transferred by contract or
through inheritance, but the conditions regarding right of use could not
be altered. 12 In 1534, Portugal promoted the occupation of Brazilian
territory through sesmarias. 13
The sesmaria system dissolved once Brazil gained independence,
and in 1850, the Brazilian Parliament approved Imperial Law No. 601,
Lei de Terras (Land Statute), along with other attempts at economic
reform. 14 The Land Statute created private property in Brazil for the first
time and treated it as an individual and absolute right. 15 “It converted
sesmaria rights holders into landowners of the estates they already held,
and extended the same ownership rights to anyone who possessed
public land for at least 100 years before the statute’s passage.” 16 By 1916,
Brazil had adopted a Civil Code that introduced the country to the
recording of deeds and stated that this “law ensures the owner the right
to use, enjoy and dispose of his property and to recover it from whoever
unjustly possesses it.” 17 As described below, this first Civil Code
encountered controversy regarding the favelas.
Favelas are “squatter communities [that result] from invasions of
public or private land.” 18 Rio de Janeiro’s first favelas date back to a
10 LAURA BECK VARELA, DAS SESMARIAS À PROPRIEDADE MODERNA: UM ESTUDO DE
HISTÓRIA DO DIREITO BRASILEIRO 22–23 (2005).
11 Id. at 24.
12 Id. at 26–27.
13 Ronaldo Vainfas, Colonists and Settlers II—Brazil, in 1 IBERIA AND THE AMERICAS:
CULTURE, POLITICS, AND HISTORY 270, 273 (J. Michael Francis ed., 2006).
14 Lei No. 601, de 18 de Setembro de 1850, COL. LEIS IMPERIO BRASIL, 307: Setembro 1850
(Braz.).
15 Id.
16 Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, The Social Function of Property in Brazilian Law, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1173 (2011).
17 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (1916) art. 524 (Braz.).
18 Ngai Pindell, Finding a Right to the City: Exploring Property and Community in Brazil
and in the United States, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 435, 445–46 (2006). For a discussion of the
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settlement on a hill called Morro da Providência. 19 Soldiers returning to
Rio de Janeiro from a civil war, Guerra de Canudos, who were unable to
afford shelter since they had not yet been paid, founded the favelas in
1898. 20 The civil war was against the settlers of Canudos, located in the
Eastern province of Bahia. 21 When Princess Isabel, the daughter of the
last Brazilian emperor, signed a decree abolishing slavery in 1888,
thousands of former slaves and indentured servants were left with no
land or possessions. 22 As such, the settlement at Canudos attracted
former slaves, as well as other landless farmers, indigenous people, and
destitute individuals. 23 When they were in Bahia, the soldiers had
become familiar with a hill called Canudos, a place that had bushes
named favelas, which “provide[d] food for flocks of small, greenfeathered Illinger’s macaws.” 24 When the soldiers settled on their hill in
Rio de Janeiro, the place received the nickname “favela.” 25 Urban
squatting settlements that followed earned the name favela, in imitation
of the soldiers’ community, both for the practice of squatting and for the
low quality of land and housing. 26
Starting in the 1920s, the rate of growth of favelas increased
because many individuals were leaving rural areas to move to cities.27
These poor and new migrants sought work in the city, but with little to
no money, they could not afford urban housing. 28 Unable to find places
to live, many of these individuals ended up in favelas. 29 In 1937, the
Código de Obras (Building Code) was the first official document to
recognize the existence of favelas, “mark[ing] the beginning of explicit

term “favela,” see Corinne Cath, On the Origin of ‘Favela’, RIOONWATCH (Feb. 14, 2012),
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=2920.
19 Greg O’Hare & Michael Barke, The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and Spatial
Analysis, 56 GEOJOURNAL 225, 232 (2002).
20 Id.; see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Property Lost in Translation, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 515, 535–36 (2013).
21 Lori Madden, The Canudos War in History, 30 LUSO-BRAZ. REV. 5, 5 (1993).
22 Id. at 6; Brazil: Five Centuries of Change, Abolition, BROWN U. LIBR., https://
library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-4/abolition (last visited Apr.
25, 2017).
23 See Madden, supra note 21, at 7.
24 JANICE A. PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE JANEIRO
24 (2010) [hereinafter PERLMAN, FAVELA]; Cath, supra note 18.
25 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 24.
26 See 1 BRAZIL TODAY: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC 253 (John J. Crocitti &
Monique M. Vallance eds., 2012); Why We Should Call Them Favelas, CATCOMM.ORG, http://
catcomm.org/call-them-favelas (last visited Apr. 25, 2017).
27 JANICE E. PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY: URBAN POVERTY AND POLITICS IN RIO
DE JANEIRO 13–14 (1976).
28 Id. at 14.
29 Id.
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favela policies.” 30 The Building Code categorized favelas as “an
aberration” and prohibited them. 31 It was expressly forbidden to build
new favelas, and the Building Code banned the expansion of existing
ones, as well as the “use of permanent building materials in favela
construction.” 32 City planners essentially “wanted them destroyed but
failed to provide any alternative.” 33 Then, in the 1940s, there was a
housing crisis in Rio de Janeiro that forced the urban poor to erect
hundreds of favelas in the suburbs, and they replaced residences as the
main type of dwelling for destitute Cariocas (inhabitants of Rio). 34
Urbanization in the 1950s also triggered another mass migration
from rural areas to the city by those hoping to take advantage of the
economic opportunities that urban life provided. 35 Nonetheless, when
the capital moved from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília in 1960, there was a
decline in employment opportunities. 36 Therefore, many individuals
who had moved to Rio de Janeiro were “[u]nable to find work” and
“afford housing within the city limits,” so they remained in the favelas. 37
Even though the favelas were located relatively close to urban Rio de
Janeiro, “the city did not extend sanitation, electricity, or other services
to the favelas.” 38 Under Governor Carlos Lacerda’s administration,
many people were relocated to public housing projects such as Cidade
de Deus (City of God), an area that became known later on due to a
movie of the same name. 39 Later, Brazil’s military dictatorship in the
1970s decided to eradicate the favelas and return the land to its private
and public owners, which displaced hundreds of thousands of
inhabitants. 40 These efforts, however, have been widely viewed as
failures. 41 For example, in some cases, “expelled” favela residents would
30 Thomas Frisch, Glimpses of Another World: The Favela as a Tourist Attraction, 14
TOURISM GEOGRAPHIES 320, 324 (2012).
31 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 27.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Cath, supra note 18; Carioca, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/carioca (last visited May 13, 2017).
35 WORLD BANK, RURAL POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN BRAZIL: TOWARD AN INTEGRATED
STRATEGY 89 (2003), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/673641468769760448/pdf/
267600PAPER0Ru1ation0See0also021790.pdf.
36 HELIA NACIF XAVIER & FERNANDA MAGALHAES, URBAN SLUM REPORTS: THE CASE OF
RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL 3 (2003), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/dpu-projects/Global_Report/pdfs/
Rio.pdf; Shanty Life in Brazil: Onward and Upward, ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010), http://
www.economist.com/node/16636391.
37 Victoria Baena, Favelas in the Spotlight: Transforming the Slums of Rio de Janeiro, 33
HARV. INT’L REV. 34, 34–37 (2011).
38 Id. at 34.
39 Id. at 35.
40 Id. at 34–35; Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 537.
41 Greg O’Hare, Urban Renaissance: New Horizons for Rio’s Favelas, 86 GEOGRAPHY 61, 63
(2001).
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find themselves simply just living in a different favela. 42 Since the
demand for favela housing remained high while the supply in the formal
market remained low, residents turned to the low-cost alternative of
squatting in a new location. 43 By the 1980s, the problem of violence
accompanying drug trade in the favelas began overshadowing the
previous concerns about eviction or eradication. 44
Residents of favelas are traditionally squatters, because they have
no legal rights to the land. 45 In other cases, residents who have occupied
land with permission of the owner can also fail to obtain formal
property rights. 46 In many instances, residents purchase irregular lots of
land that developers sold to them without observing “municipal
subdivision and infrastructure regulations.” 47 These illegal real estate
subdivisions are known as loteamentos. 48 The law does not recognize
sales of lots in illegal loteamentos because the lots have not been
formally subdivided, and thus they cannot be registered and neither can
titles be issued. 49 Loteamentos tend to pop up on the outskirts of the city
where legal urban residential use is not an option. 50
Despite their unorthodox beginnings, favelas have become
respected through social norms “notwithstanding the lack of formal
property rights.” 51 Although favelas often become communities that
have regular features such as grocery stores and other local businesses,
in the early days homes lacked basic utilities including electricity or
plumbing. 52 The Brazilian census in 1950 defined favelas not only by the
absence of legal title, but also by low-quality housing, the absence of
paved streets, and lack of public utilities such as plumbing. 53 By 2001,
however, residents in favelas generally had access to electricity and
water. 54 The majority of the favelas are located on steep hills that are
Cf. ORDE MORTON, RIO: THE STORY OF THE MARVELOUS CITY 303 (2015).
O’Hare & Barke, supra note 19, at 237.
44 Baena, supra note 37, at 35.
45 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 535.
46 Id.
47 Pindell, supra note 18, at 447.
48 Informações Sobre Favelas e Loteamentos—SABREN, PREFEITURA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
(June 20, 2014), http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/web/ipp/exibeconteudo?id=4782931.
49 GEORGE MARTINE & GORDON MCGRANAHAN, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T & DEV., UNITED
NATIONS POPULATION FUND, BRAZIL’S EARLY URBAN TRANSITION: WHAT CAN IT TEACH
URBANIZING COUNTRIES? 32 (2010).
50 Pindell, supra note 18, at 448.
51 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 535.
52 See id. at 536.
53 Fred B. Morris & Gerald F. Pyle, The Social Environment of Rio de Janeiro in 1960, 47
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 286, 288 (1971).
54 Alan M. White, Market Price, Social Price, and the Right to the City: Land Taxes and
Rates for City Services in Brazil and the United States, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 313, 322
(2013).
42
43
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difficult to access; in fact, before it is settled by squatters, the invaded
land is often considered unsuitable for human habitation. 55
In the West Zone of the city, favela residents live in barracos
(shacks) that are not fully constructed, and many of the favelas and
loteamentos do not have much access to urban services. 56 In the South
Zone, favelas are located on the hillsides of the Tijuca forest. 57 The
North Zone begins at Grande Tijuca, which is a middle-class area, and
also where many of the favelas are located. 58 Close to forty favelas have
armed guards and gatekeepers that stand at the entrance to the favelas. 59
According to the latest census conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), there are 1,393,314 people in 763
favelas in Rio de Janeiro. 60 Additionally, approximately fifteen percent
of Rio de Janeiro residents live in favelas or other “subnormal
agglomerates.”61 Favelas are continuing “to grow at a faster pace than
the population of the city as a whole.”62 The reason for favelas’
continued popularity remains a matter of controversy. Even though
favela homes are made out of lower-quality materials, they offer
migrants to cities inexpensive housing in convenient locations—
something not available in the formal housing market. 63 Favela scholar
Janice Perlman also found that home owners were less likely than
renters to exit favelas because the owners “had invested their life savings
in their houses, . . . expanded their dwellings to include space for their
grown children and their families, and . . . stood to lose their investment
if they left [the areas where] violence had devalued their property.” 64
Homeowners sometimes face a dilemma when it comes to moving
because leaving the favela can mean giving up living space, moving
farther away from the city, and/or giving up existing employment. 65
While there has been investment in government housing, said housing

Pindell, supra note 18, at 446–47.
PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 31.
57 Id. at 32.
58 Rio de Janeiro, DAVIS HUNTER, http://www.davishunter.com/home/place/Rio%20de%
20Janeiro (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
59 Pacifying Police Units (UPP), CATCOMM.ORG, http://catcomm.org/upp (last visited July
5, 2015).
60 Fiona Hurrell, Rio Favela Population Largest in Brazil: Daily, RIO TIMES (Dec. 23, 2011),
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/rios-favela-population-largest-in-brazil.
61 2010 Census: 11.4 Million Brazilians (6.0%) Live in Subnormal Agglomerates, INSTITUTO
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (Dec. 21, 2011), http://saladeimprensa.ibge.gov.br/
en/noticias?view=noticia&idnoticia=2057&t=censo-2010-11-4-milhoes-brasileiros-6-0-vivemaglomerados-subnormais.
62 Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 20, at 536.
63 Id. at 537–38.
64 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 234.
65 See id.
55
56
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at times does not meet the needs of favela residents. 66 These needs
include affordability, closeness to work and school, ability to access
urban services, and “security against eviction.” 67 Meanwhile, politicians
have sought “the photo-op—at a ribbon-cutting ceremony in front of
rows of colorfully painted little houses. They wanted rapid completion
of the finished houses and rapid cost recuperation. Distance from the
city or availability of public transportation were of no concern—they
wanted the cheapest land possible. Thus the mismatch.” 68
II. THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
In favelas, the primary goal of the occupier is possession of the land
on which she is living for as long as possible. 69 In favelas and
loteamentos, “residents generally live without formal property
protections.” 70 Created due to poor city planning, rapid growth, and a
necessity for poor people to live somewhere, favelas and loteamentos
arise outside of the legal, formal land market. 71 Local governments have
employed various reform efforts over the years with mixed results.72
Although some of these initial efforts focused on hindering the growth
of informal settlements, there have been measures for many years that
have addressed the legalization of ownership of land in existing
settlements and the improvement of infrastructure like roads and sewer
services. 73

66 See Constance G. Anthony, Urban Forced Removals in Rio De Janeiro and Los Angeles:
North-South Similarities in Race and City, 44 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 337, 348 (2013);
Clarisse Cunha Linke, In Brazil, Connecting Social Housing with the City, INST. TRANSP. & DEV.
POL’Y, Winter 2016, at 27, 27, https://www.itdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Brazil-SocialHousing.pdf; Ruban Selvanayagam, No Better than the Slums? What Went Wrong with Brazil’s
Social Housing, GUARDIAN (Mar. 26, 2014, 6:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/housingnetwork/2014/mar/26/brazil-social-housing-favelas-slums.
67 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 268.
68 Id.
69 Pindell, supra note 18, at 448.
70 Id. at 445.
71 ROBERT NEUWIRTH, SHADOW CITIES: A BILLION SQUATTERS, A NEW URBAN WORLD 9
(2005); Informações Sobre Favelas e Loteamentos—SABREN, supra note 48.
72 See generally WORLD BANK, BRAZIL: IMPACT EVALUATION REPORT: LEARNING FROM BEST
PRACTICE IN FIVE URBAN PROJECTS, NO. 16736 (1997).
73 See id. at ix; see also Catherine Osborn, A History of Favela Upgrades Part II: Introducing
Favela–Bairro (1988–2008), RIOONWATCH (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=
5931.
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The Legal Framework of Property Rights in Rio de Janeiro

French philosopher Henri Lefebvre popularized a “right to the city”
concept, which merged two notions: “[T]he social function of property
and the social function of the city.” 74 Additionally, the author of the
Brazilian Civil Code of 1916, Clovis Bevilaqua, also implied that there is
a concept that property rights serve a social function. 75 Its principles
have since been adopted in the 1988 Brazilian Constitution and the 2001
City Statute. 76 The National Movement for Urban Reform insisted that
inequalities in Brazilian land ownership had to be redressed as the
country’s dictatorial government was crumbling and the 1988
Constitution was in the process of being written. When Brazil was
coming out of a dictatorial political model, and the 1988 Constitution
was being drafted, the National Movement for Urban Reform was very
adamant about advocating for legal measures that would combat
centuries of unequal concentration of land ownership in Brazil. 77
“Academics, activists and neighborhood associations worked together,
and as a result, the social use of land and the right for small-scale urban
land ownership was included in the [1988] constitution.” 78 Specifically,
Article 170 in Chapter One’s “The General Principles of Economic
Activity” speaks about the “social function of property.” 79 Additionally,
Article 183 of Chapter Two’s Urban Policy explicitly states that:
An individual who possesses as theirs an urban area up to two
hundred and fifty square meters, for five years, without interruption
or opposition, using it as his or as his family’s home, shall acquire
domain of it, provided that he does not own any other urban or rural
property.
The deed of possession and concession of use shall be granted to
the man or woman, or both, regardless of their marital status. 80

Pindell, supra note 18, at 436.
Cunha, supra note 16, at 1174.
76 Id. at 1176; Evaniza Rodrigues & Benedito Roberto Barbosa, Popular Movements and the
City Statute, in THE CITY STATUTE OF BRAZIL: A COMMENTARY 23, 25 (2010), http://
www.citiesalliance.org/sites/citiesalliance.org/files/CA_Images/CityStatuteofBrazil_English_
fulltext.pdf.
77 Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, CATCOMM.ORG, http://catcomm.org/adversepossession (last visited June 23, 2015).
78 Id.
79 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 170 (Braz.).
80 Id. art. 183.
74
75
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As such, the federal guarantee of the right to adverse possession for the
purpose of housing stemmed from the 1988 Constitution, and was
based on the “social function of property.” 81
The 2001 City Statute builds on the 1988 Constitution to create a
new legal system that provides land access and equity in large urban
cities. 82 The Statute has two main functions: (1) to ensure that the
“social function” of urban land and buildings is put before their
commercial value, and (2) to guarantee “democratic city
management . . . [and] a path to plan, produce, operate and govern cities
subject to social control and participation of civil society.” 83 Moreover,
the 2001 City Statute has sixteen guidelines to advance the social
function of the city, including “the ‘right to sustainable cities,’ the
promotion of community participation in the creation and monitoring
of development projects, an emphasis on effective planning of urban
areas, and the ‘regularization of land ownership and urbanization of
areas occupied by low income populations’” (i.e., favelas). 84 The Statute
also creates a “Concession of Law for public lands in which squatters
[i.e., residents of favelas] can obtain use rights (as opposed to ownership
rights) for public lands that they occupy.”85 It states that:
Whomever [sic], until June 30, 2001, possesses as his or her own, for
a period five years, without interruption and without opposition, up
to two hundred and fifty square meters of public real estate located in
an urban area, using it for his own residence or that of his family, has
the right to concession of special use for housing purposes in relation
to the property that is the object of said possession, as long as he is
not the owner or concessionaire, in any form, of any other urban or
rural real estate. 86

While the residents of many favelas could apply for title under Article
183 of the 1988 Constitution and the 2001 City Statute, they would have
to show the government documentary evidence of their history. 87 With
Brazil hosting mega sports events, such as the 2014 World Cup and the
2016 Olympics, several favelas came under greater threats of removal,
which increased residents’ interest in accessing title. 88
Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, supra note 77.
See Rodrigues & Barbosa, supra note 76, at 25.
83 @thepolisblog, Implementing the Right to the City in Brazil?, SMARTCITIESDIVE (Oct. 14,
2011), http://www.smartcitiesdive.com/ex/sustainablecitiescollective/implementing-right-citybrazil/30417.
84 Pindell, supra note 18, at 454.
85 Id.
86 Lei No. 10.257, de 10 de Julho de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 11.7.2001
(Braz.).
87 Adverse Possession/Squatter’s Rights, supra note 77.
88 Id.
81
82
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According to Bevilaqua, property rights must be subjected to
“restrictions determined by considerations of social order. And modern
Codes are leaning toward finding a balance between the individual’s
interest and that of society.” 89 This concept was further solidified
through the adoption of the 2002 Civil Code. 90 The first paragraph of
the 2002 Civil Code states:
The right of property must be exercised in accordance with its
economic, social and environmental ends, so that the flora, fauna and
natural beauties are preserved, as well as the ecological equilibrium
and the historical and artistic patrimonies, and so that air and water
pollution are averted, in obedience of the rules established by specific
legislation. 91

Thus, the Code connects the exercise of property rights to “economic,
social, and environmental ends.”92 The 2002 Civil Code also identifies
three types of adverse possession: (1) ordinary adverse possession, (2)
extraordinary adverse possession, and (3) special adverse possession. 93
First, ordinary adverse possession transfers ownership of property to the
individual who, intending to become its owner, remains in possession of
said property, undisputedly and without opposition, for a continuous
period of between five and fifteen years. 94 Second, extraordinary adverse
possession transfers ownership of the property to the individual who
remains in possession of said property for a continuous period of fifteen
years, regardless of the existence of any proof. 95 Additionally, if the
property has been the owner’s residence, or if the individual has
improved the land in some way, the statutory period is reduced to ten
years. 96 Third, special urban adverse possession occurs when an
individual who is not a title-owner of an urban or rural property and
remains in possession of that property—as her place of residence for a
continuous period without any opposition—is granted title to said

1 CLOVIS BEVILAQUA, DIREITO DAS COISAS 134 (1941); Cunha, supra note 16, at 1174.
Cunha, supra note 16, at 1180.
91 C.C. (2002) art. 1228, § 1 (Braz.); see also Cunha, supra note 16, 1180.
92 Cunha, supra note 16, at 1180.
93 C.C. (2002) art. 1242 (Braz.); see also Ellade Imparato, Security of Tenure in São Paulo, in
HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 127, 129 (Alain Durand-Lasserve & Lauren Royston eds., 2002).
94 C.C. (2002) art. 1242 (Braz.); see also José Isaac Pilati, Property Law, in INTRODUCTION
TO BRAZILIAN LAW 71, 74 (Fabiano Deffenti & Welber Barral eds., 2011); JC Moraes, Resumo:
Usucapião—Espécies e Requisitos, JCMORAES.COM (Apr. 14, 2011), https://jcmoraes.com/2011/
04/14/resumo-usucapiao-%E2%80%93-especies-e-requisitos.
95 C.C. (2002) art. 1238 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, DOING BUSINESS IN
BRAZIL 12-5 (2013); Pilati, supra note 94, at 74.
96 C.C. (2002) art. 1238 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 125; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74.
89
90
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property. 97 The property may not exceed 250 square meters and must be
the place of residence of the owner or her family. 98 Further, special
adverse possession happens when an individual who is not a title-owner
of an urban or rural property, and remains in possession of that
property for a continuous period of five years, having improved it
through her or her family’s efforts, and with it being her place of
residence without any opposition, receives the right to acquire title to
said property. 99 The total area of the rural property must not exceed fifty
hectares. 100
These recent attempts to advocate for a “right to the city” show
how complex it is to address individualized understandings of
property. 101 Furthermore, these measures suggest that national policies
can encourage implementation at the local level. 102 For example, at the
local level, residents whose formal property rights conflict can have a
meaningful exchange thanks to programs that evaluate the property
distribution scheme that is in place. 103
B.

Zoning Regulations

To fully understand the obstacles that future reforms face, it is
important to grasp the structure of zoning regulations in Rio de Janeiro.
The Law of Land Use and Occupation (LUOS), established in 2013, sets
forth principles and guidelines for the use and occupation of urban
space, and the ultimate goal of the law is to ensure the development of
the city in a balanced and sustainable way. 104 Most of the rules that
govern the use of land and space involve calculations.
When a new building is being constructed, homebuilders must
apply the formula ATE = IAT x S. 105 As such, the total buildable area
(ATE) is the maximum buildable area that results from multiplying the
Land Utilization Index (IAT), which is the number of days when crops
97 C.C. (2002) art. 1240 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 125; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74.
98 C.C. (2002) art. 1240 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 125; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74.
99 C.C. (2002) art. 1239 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 125; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74–75.
100 C.C. (2002) art. 1239 (Braz.); see also PINHEIRO NETO–ADVOGADOS, supra note 95, at 125; Pilati, supra note 94, at 74–75.
101 Pindell, supra note 18, at 458.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 1 (Braz.); see also
SECRETARIA MUNICIPAL DE URBANISMO, RIO PREFEITURA, LEI DE USO E OCUPAÇÃO DO SOLO
LUOS, http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/documents/91237/ddbd40f5-fa89-40ff-b7e3-c2a9339f578d.
105 Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 140 (Braz.).
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occupy the land during a year divided by 365, by the land area (S). 106
LUOS may establish differentiated Land Utilization Indices within the
same district according to the land’s characteristics, but they are subject
to the maximum values set out in Annex VII of Rio de Janeiro’s Master
Plan, which lists all of the barrios in Rio de Janeiro and their
corresponding IATs. 107 Locations that are being built that cannot use the
ATE calculation include: (1) parking garages; (2) concierge and access
buildings; (3) custodian’s apartment and common areas; (4) water
tanks, engine rooms, and other technical compartments located at any
level of the building; (5) verandas and balconies; (6) uncovered terraces;
(7) covered terraces for common use; and (8) watchtowers and
aedicule. 108
The maximum occupancy rate allowed (TO) represents the ratio
between the maximum horizontal projection allowed for the building
and the total area of land. 109 It is expressed in the following formula:
TO = Area Horizontal Projection of Maximum Building x 100
Total Area of Land 110
The maximum horizontal projection of buildings includes all the
covered areas of the building, excluding the areas designed for porches,
balconies, and overhangs. 111 Additionally, in single-family and twofamily buildings, the balconies resting on the ground will also not be
included in the maximum area of projection. 112
The maximum building height is measured between the groundfloor level and the highest point of the building, including all elements
except: (1) mechanical equipment, water tanks, engine rooms, stairway
enclosures common to the roof level; (2) ventilation ducts of enclosed
stairs; (3) underground floors buried and semi-buried, in accordance
with article 169 of the LUOS; and (4) vertical access on land uphill in
accordance with Articles 166 and 173 of the LUOS. 113 Furthermore, the
maximum height and the maximum number of floors in a building are
established by considering the relevant interests of the surrounding
landscape and the urban environment where they are located, including:
(1) the street width; (2) aeration of the city blocks; (3) the altitude and
natural topography of the land; (4) waterfront, protected bodies of
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
Lei Complementar No. 111, de 1 de Fevereiro de 2011, Anexo VII (Braz.).
Lei Complementar No. 33, de 25 de Novembro de 2013, art. 142 (Braz.).
Id. art. 149.
Id.
Id. art. 150.
Id. art. 150, § 1.
Id. art. 162.
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water, and mountains; (5) the maximum shading allowed on the
beaches; (6) preserved goods; (7) use and type of building; (8) existing
infrastructure or projected infrastructure; (9) restriction cones and
bands imposed for airports and aerodromes in specific legislation; and
(10) occupancy characteristics of the surroundings. 114
Municipal law has the ability to designate areas that contain many
clashes in land ownership, including favelas, as “special social interest
zones.” 115 This legally assures the stability of residents’ homes by legally
acknowledging that these types of areas are intended to provide housing
to groups that rely on being able to continue living in informal
settlements, such as favelas. 116 Furthermore, designating such areas as
“special social interest zones” helps avoid any forced evictions that
would result from breaking zoning laws. 117 Whenever residents confront
the possibility of eviction, courts can rule for the social group that lives
in the informal settlement and begin a negotiation conversation
between whoever owns the area, the inhabitants, and the government. 118
C.

The Cartório System

Any reform proposals will require a clear grounding in Brazil’s
system of administration and title registration. One key piece of this
system is the cartório, who is essentially a notary that takes care of
several different types of important documents. 119 The majority of
documents in Brazil that require a signature, including, but not limited
to, a power of attorney, title of property, marriage certificates, and more,
must be notarized by a cartório for them to be recognized as legal
documents. 120
After the fall of the Roman Empire and during the ascent of the
Catholic Church, the cartório system took over the registration of births
and deaths. 121 Initially, it was mostly just registering nobles, kings,
Id. art. 161.
Nelson Saule Junior, The Right to Housing and the Prevention of Forced Evictions in
Brazil, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, supra note 93, at 138, 147.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 O que é Serventia Extrajudicial (Cartório)?, PODER JUDICIÁRIO, http://www7.tjce.jus.br/
sefin/?page_id=945
[https://web.archive.org/web/20160417080253/http://www7.tjce.jus.br/
sefin/?page_id=945].
120 Id.; see also Patrick Bruha, Notary Public Offices in Brazil, BRAZ. BUS. (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/notary-public-offices-in-brazil.
121 Robério Fernandes, A Origem Dos Cartórios de Registros Civis, HISTÓRIA E SUAS
CURIOSIDADES (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:59 PM), http://historiaesuascuriosidades.blogspot.com/2011/02/
origem-dos-cartorios-de-registros-civis.html.
114
115
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clerics, and others who were considered important. 122 France has a long
tradition of universally registering births and graves. 123 The country
began to register these events in the mid-sixteenth century, an initiative
that the Catholic Church started. 124 After the Council of Trent ended in
1563, the Church officially implemented civil registration and
registration of deaths across socioeconomic strata. 125 With the adoption
of the Napoleonic Code in the the early-nineteenth century, France
officially transferred the responsibility of civil registration to the State. 126
Similarly, in Brazil the Church also transitioned away from
maintaining such records in the second half of the nineteenth century.127
In 1863, through a decree, the imperial government started recording
the marriages of non-Catholics, and, in 1874, the process of recording
and registering birth, marriage, and death certificates began in Brazil. 128
The word cartório was originally coined in Portugal to designate a
recorder or notary. 129 In Brazil, the word came to designate an entity
that possessed a wider range of skills and responsibilities, including civil
registration of individuals and legal entities, property registration,
registration of deeds and documents, notary notes, bonds, court
documents, and more. 130
The Brazilian Constitution describes cartórios and registrar services
as “extrajudicial services.” 131 Private individuals, who act under
authority delegated to them by the State, provide both cartório and
property registration services. 132 Although these individuals are not
technically “state employees” or “public officials,” under article 327 of
the Brazilian Criminal Code, they can be considered public officials and
held liable for certain criminal actions. 133 According to Law 8.935, which
was established in 1994, general cartórios, known as tabeliaes de notas,
and property registrars, known as oficiais de registro de imóveis, 134 have
ample power to manage their offices and may contract as many
assistants (substitutes, clerks, and auxiliaries) as they deem necessary to
Id.
Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Cartório, WORDREFERENCE.COM, http://www.wordreference.com/pten/cartório (last
visited Apr. 28, 2017); História dos Cartórios, ARPEN.SP, http://www.arpensp.org.br/principal/
index.cfm?pagina_id=181 (last visited June 24, 2015).
130 História dos Cartórios, supra note 129.
131 Id.; see also C.F. art. 236 (Braz.).
132 C.F. art. 236 (Braz.).
133 Código Penal [C.P.] [Penal Code] art. 327 (Braz.).
134 See
generally 12 REGISTRO DE IMÓVEIS DO RIO DE JANEIRO, https://
www.12registro.com.br (last visited Apr. 28, 2017).
122
123
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assist them in providing efficient services. 135 General cartórios have
exclusive authority to draft public writings and powers of attorneys,
notarial acts, and authenticate signatures and copies. 136 Cartórios may
only exercise authority within the municipality in which they have been
appointed. 137 To become a notary, an individual must, among other
things, take a public examination, have a legal degree or at least ten
years of experience in notarial or register services, and exhibit
professional conduct in accordance with ethical business standards.138
There is no requirement in any of the regulations that cartórios post any
bond or acquire insurance to cover their liability. 139
Cartórios and registrars are liable to third parties for damages
caused by any act performed by them or their respective assistants that
violate a formal requirement of their duties. 140 Additionally, the State
has subsidiary liability because cartórios and registrars perform
functions delegated by the State. 141 Injured parties must first sue the
cartório, and can only make a claim against the State if such suit has
been successful and the cartório does not have funds to cover the
claim. 142 In practice, however, litigation in Brazil is a complex and
lengthy proposition.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF FAVELA—STATE RELATIONSHIP
A.

The History of and the Current Mechanisms for Real Estate
Transactions Inside the Favelas

The history of Brazilian politics and the history of favela growth
inform the evolving and fluctuating relationship between the Brazilian
government and the favelas. 143 The relationship, at any given time, is
further complicated by the fact that any given favela may be located on
land owned by an amalgam of interests. 144 A favela may sit on parcels of
land that are owned by the federal government, the state government,
Lei No. 8.935, de 18 de Novembro de 1994, arts. 20–21, D.O.U. de 21.11.1994 (Braz.).
Id. art. 7.
137 Id. art. 9.
138 Id. arts. 14–19.
139 See id.
140 Id. arts. 22–24.
141 See, e.g., R.S.T.J., Ap. Civ. No. 2008/0204801-9, Relator: Des. Herman Benjamin,
02.02.2010 (Braz.).
142 See, e.g., id.
143 See generally Anthony, supra note 66.
144 See JANICE E. PERLMAN, INT’L HOUS. COAL., IT ALL DEPENDS: BUYING AND SELLING
HOUSES IN RIO’S FAVELAS 11−12 (2010) [hereinafter PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS], http://
ihcglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/perlman-final-final-paper.pdf.
135
136
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the municipal government, and one or more private parties. 145 Thus, a
uniform policy toward regularizing the ownership within a given favela,
much less across the favelas, is quite hard to implement. 146 These
difficulties are compounded by the putative beneficiaries’ lack of
understanding 147 and of resources to navigate a complex judicial and
administrative system. 148 This Section will describe the evolution of the
government policy toward the favelas, the current state of affairs, as well
as the perception of the current state of affairs by the residents of the
favelas themselves.
The relationship between the Brazilian authorities and the favelas
has undergone a substantial evolution and is still in a state of
considerable flux. Given their origin as settlements for discharged
soldiers and freed slaves 149—both relatively outcast groups—it is not
surprising that the favelas were a breeding ground for non-conformist
behavior of all types. 150 Indeed, the very creation of favelas in violation
of the law and property rights of true owners was a subversive act.151
The government’s response to these acts, therefore, often tracked the
government’s general toleration of non-conforming behavior. 152
The first thrust against the favelas happened in 1937 during the socalled Estado Novo (New State) era. 153 That year, Getúlio Vargas
assumed dictatorial powers and abolished Congress and political

145 Id. at 12. For example, the favela of “Santa Marta has three parts, two are private and
anything that is above . . . 100 meters and the hill belongs to the government.” Interview with
Favela Residents 29 (Feb. 7, 2016) (transcript and audio on file with authors).
146 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 12 (“There are favelas in which land ownership
of a particular parcel is contested among the descendents [sic] of private owners who claim to
have historic deeds. Under existing land use laws, these claims have to be adjudicated parcel by
parcel and lot by lot, so no overall resolution of land tenure for the entire community is
possible.”).
147 See id. at 17 (describing how unscrupulous individuals take advantage of favela residents
who are unable to understand the “fine print” of legal documents).
148 See Adam Smith, The Cantagalo Project: Judicial and Administrative Land Titling in the
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, DIVERSITATES, Dec. 2011, at 19, 36, https://
diversitatesjournal.files.wordpress.com/2012/01/diversitates_3_-n-2_-artigo-2.pdf (“The first
significant obstacle to the adoption of administrative land titling is the cost of the project.”).
149 See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text; see also Anthony, supra note 66, at 344.
150 See PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at XXIII–XXIV.
151 See generally Peter Bishop, From the Subversive to the Serious: Temporary Urbanism as a
Positive Force, in PAVILIONS, POP-UPS AND PARASOLS: THE IMPACT OF REAL AND VIRTUAL
MEETING ON PHYSICAL SPACE 136 (Leon van Schaik & Fleur Watson eds., 2015).
152 See ERIKA ROBB LARKINS, THE SPECTACULAR FAVELA: VIOLENCE IN MODERN BRAZIL 8
(2015).
153 See Enrique R. Carrasco & Sean Williams, Emerging Economies After the Global Financial
Crisis: The Case of Brazil, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81, 93 (2012) (describing the establishment
of Estado Novo).
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parties. 154 Not coincidentally, that same year, a new building code was
promulgated which “strictly forb[ade] the building of new favelas and
[the improvement of] any aspect of established buildings.” 155 By 1940,
the Vargas regime began “wholesale razing” of the favelas, with the
concomitant attempts to move the disposed residents into public
housing. 156 Although promoted as a way to improve living conditions
and reduce poverty among the residents of the favelas, 157 the project had
another goal in mind as well. The “entry gates, ID cards, and an evening
loud speaker that broadcast lectures on moral behavior” 158 within the
new public housing projects were “designed not only to accommodate
but also to isolate and control.” 159 Furthermore, and as is common in
non-democratic regimes, corruption prevailed and “[t]he best
units . . . went to public employees and those with influence.” 160 The
Estado Novo came to an end in 1945 161 and with it, the policy of favela
eradication ended 162 (though as described below, only for a while). The
top-down policies of the Vargas regime “did not result in a more vibrant
community, less poverty, and did not solve the low-income housing
crisis.”163
With the return to democracy, the policies toward favelas shifted
from eradication to amelioration, though not yet to regularization of
ownership. 164 The new government, now in need of votes from the
residents of the favelas, began to provide some services, including roads,
clinics, power lines, etc. 165 At the same time, the threat of eviction and
dispossession remained omnipresent, thus providing a powerful
combination for the authorities—they could entice votes with various
improvement projects, while at the same time threatening the
recalcitrant residents with eviction. 166 The Catholic Church, consistent
154 See Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 580 (2005) [hereinafter
Rosenn, Federalism]; Keith S. Rosenn, Separation of Powers in Brazil, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 839, 843–
44 (2009) [hereinafter Rosenn, Separation of Powers].
155 Anthony, supra note 66, at 346.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id. (quoting ROBERT GAY, POPULAR ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN RIO DE
JANEIRO: A TALE OF TWO FAVELAS 16 (1994)).
160 Id.
161 See Rosenn, Separation of Powers, supra note 154, at 845.
162 See Anthony, supra note 66, at 346.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 346–47 (“With democracy came more attention to social welfare and the
deceleration of favela eradication.”).
165 See GAY, supra note 159, at 18; Lea Ramsdell, National Housing Policy and the Favela in
Brazil, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BRAZIL: PUBLIC POLICIES IN AN ERA OF TRANSITION 164,
167 (Lawrence S. Graham & Robert H. Wilson eds., 1990).
166 GAY, supra note 159, at 18; Anthony, supra note 66, at 347.
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with its mission to help the poor, also began addressing the problems
with favela life. 167 In 1955, Dom Hélder Câmara, the then-Bishop of
Recife and Auxiliary Bishop of Rio de Janeiro, started the Cruzada São
Sebastião (St. Sebastian’s Crusade), which was a federal scheme to
construct an apartment complex in the largest horizontal favela at the
time, Praia do Pinto. 168 The goal of the Cruzada was to transform favela
residents into more acceptable citizens by only housing those willing to
give up the corruptions associated with favela life. 169
As mentioned previously, the policies toward the favelas have
tracked the political situation overall. So when in 1964 an additional
coup resulted in yet another military dictatorship, 170 the State’s policy
toward the favelas reverted back to that of the 1930s and 1940s. 171 The
Brazilian military government of the 1960s and 1970s has a welldeserved reputation as a brutal and oppressive regime that did not
tolerate much, if any, dissent. 172 This attitude was also projected onto
the favelas. As a result, once again, the policy was that of favela
eradication in preference to any other approach. 173 During this period,
the favelas that occupied particularly attractive locations were the most
targeted for demolition. 174 In all, over 175,000 Cariocas residing in
favelas were dispossessed of their homes with the land being used for
the benefit of parties more in favor with the ruling junta. 175 The military
government of the 1960s also copied the attempts of its 1940s
predecessor to build public housing for the displaced favela residents
where the latter could be better “controlled.” 176 This attempt was an
Anthony, supra note 66, at 346; Smith, supra note 148, at 22.
Julio Cesar Pino, Sources on the History of the Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, 32 LATIN AM.
RES. REV. 111, 114 (1997); The Disappearing Favelas, RIO THEN (Dec. 18, 2013), https://
riothen.wordpress.com/tag/praia-do-pinto.
169 Pino, supra note 168, at 114.
170 Rosenn, Federalism, supra note 154, at 581.
171 Anthony, supra note 66, at 347.
172 See Kristin Tennyson Graham et al., Mobilizing Law in Latin America: An Evaluation of
Black’s Theory in Brazil, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 322, 323–24 (2013); Brazil: Report on Past
Atrocities a Key Step Forward, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 30, 2007, 8:00 PM) https://
www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/30/brazil-report-past-atrocities-key-step-forward (“Brazil has
finally released a comprehensive account of the brutal methods that its military regime used to
dispose of political opponents.”).
173 See Cristiane Rose Duarte & Fernanda Magalhães, Upgrading Squatter Settlements into
City Neighborhoods, in CONTEMPORARY URBANISM IN BRAZIL: BEYOND BRASÍLIA 268 (Vicente
del Rio & William Siembieda eds., 2009) (“[G]overnment policies took a radical approach by
viewing favelas as a malaise that should be removed from cities.”).
174 Id. (noting that most of the removed favelas were “occupying attractive sites near the
coastline and in middle-class neighborhoods”).
175 Anthony, supra note 66, at 348.
176 See id. (“The large-scale public housing in the north that was created was similar to the
Parque Prolitarios but even less attentive to the needs of its residents for community and urban
amenities.”); Michel Jaquet, Cidade de Deus—Working with Informalized Mass Housing in
167
168
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even bigger failure than its 1940s cousin and is perhaps best exemplified
by the flagship project Cidade de Deus or “City of God” in English. 177
Because the junta’s actual goal was not alleviation of poverty or
improvement in the lot of the poor (as the junta did not need their
electoral or economic support), 178 the Cidade de Deus project was
located far from the center of Rio, and with little to no access to things
like electricity or running water. 179 Those familiar with the eponymous
film know the end result of this project, and that, far from being a
solution to any of the favela problems, the public housing project
concentrated poverty even further and became a breeding ground for
violence, drug trade, disease, and early and untimely death. 180 What is
even more remarkable is that Cidade de Deus, originally conceived as an
orderly public housing project, itself became a favela as soon as the
military junta relaxed its grip on the country. 181
The eradication process began to significantly slow down as Brazil
entered the 1980s. 182 At the time, the military’s position began to
weaken as the opposition to its iron-fisted rule grew. 183 The Catholic
Church (again mirroring the post-Estado Novo period) regained much
influence and expanded its work in the favelas. 184 Indeed, as a current
resident recounted, the Church’s influence became so great that some of
the favelas became known as “pastoral favelas.” 185 However, once again,
the Church could do little to change the fundamental legal issues in the
favelas—the lack of legal rights to the homes that the favela residents
Brazil by Marc Angélil and Rainer Hehl [Book Review], RIOONWATCH (Apr. 5, 2014), http://
www.rioonwatch.org/?p=14308.
177 See Jaquet, supra note 176.
178 Anthony, supra note 66, at 339 ("[An authoritarian] state need not be attentive to
elections or the need for legitimacy with a larger constituency. As a consequence, the state
privileges some population groups over others in the urban, political imagination.” (footnote
omitted)); Jaquet, supra note 176.
179 See Favelas: City of God, JAUREGUI (last visited July 17, 2016), http://
www.jauregui.arq.br/favelas_city_of_god.html; see also BRYAN MCCANN, HARD TIMES IN THE
MARVELOUS CITY: FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY IN THE FAVELAS OF RIO DE JANEIRO
31–32 (2014).
180 See Alex Bellos, Film Shows Violence of Rio’s Gangster Children, but the Reality Is Far
Worse, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Jan. 23, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/GWeekly/Story/
0,,879929,00.html.
181 See Jaquet, supra note 176.
182 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 7; Anthony, supra note 66, at 348−49;
Smith, supra note 148, at 23−24.
183 Anthony, supra note 66, at 348−49.
184 See John C. Martin, Note, Bringing Dead Capital to Life: International Mandates for Land
Titling in Brazil, 31 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 121, 121 (2008).
185 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 40–41; see also Pastoral Land
Commission
(CPT),
ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/
encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/pastoral-land-commission-cpt (last visited Apr.
28, 2017); cf. Taylor Reeves Dalton, Rights for the Landless: Comparing Approaches to Historical
Injustice in Brazil and South Africa, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 171, 183–84 (2012).
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occupied. 186 Even with the abatement of the eradication process, the
residents of the favelas remained at the mercy of government officials
who could expel them at whim, because, after all, the residents had no
legal right to be on the land in question. 187
Making matters worse still, when the military finally surrendered
power in the mid to late 1980s, it bequeathed the new civilian
government massive economic problems. 188 With the Brazilian
economy plagued by hyperinflation, soaring unemployment, and high
interest rates, 189 the underprivileged residents of the favelas were the
hardest hit. 190 At the same time, and perhaps in part because of the
absence of legitimate avenues for economic improvement, Brazil as a
whole, and Rio in particular, became a major hub for international drug
trafficking. 191 Rio’s favelas presented a perfect milieu for the gangs that
sought to control the flow of drugs and money. 192 Not only were the
favelas poor, but their physical characteristics were often ideal for illegal

186 See generally Kristen Mitchell, Market-Assisted Land Reform in Brazil: A New Approach
to Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 557, 571 (2003).
187 See, e.g., PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 4 (“The possibility of eviction is much
lower since the return to democracy in 1985 following 21 years of military dictatorship, but in
the past five years the issue has been raised again. As recently as 2009, the Mayor of Rio
declared that with regard to favela policy, ‘nothing is off the table.’”); id. at 15 (noting that
prices within favelas vary according to the risk of removal); id. at 24 (noting that there is always
risk of favela removal, especially “where land values are high”); Anthony, supra note 66, at 351
(“In 2005, the city’s Public Prosecutor’s office wanted to see fourteen favelas removed, all of
which were proximate to middle class neighborhoods.”). The favela residents know about the
precariousness of their situation. One of them explained that the uncertainty has made people
skeptical even of government documents that confer some rights to the land, stating “what
we’re saying now is even in favelas where people actually had that document, if the government
wants to evict them they will anyway, so there isn’t that much of a point for it.” Interview with
Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 31.
188 See Marcos Aurélio Pereira Valadao, Washington Consensus and Latin America
Integration: Mercosur and the Road to Regional Inconsistencies—To Where Are We Going
Exactly?, 15 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 207, 211 (2009); William H. Page, Antitrust Review of
Mergers in Transition Economies: A Comment, with Some Lessons from Brazil, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1113, 1119 (1998).
189 See Janice E. Perlman, The Metamorphosis of Marginality: Four Generations in the
Favelas of Rio de Janeiro, 606 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 154, 154–55 (2006)
[hereinafter Perlman, Metamorphosis]. See generally Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, The Brazilian
Economy, 1980–1994 (Pontifical Catholic Univ., Dep’t of Econ., Discussion Paper No. 492,
2004), http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td492.pdf.
190 Isabella Di Paolo, Inflation and Instability: Brazil’s Lost Decade and Cardoso’s Response,
27 STUDENT ECON. REV. 99, 101 (2013) (“As high and volatile inflation rates damaged
economic performance, Brazil’s poorest were hit the hardest.”).
191 See Anthony, supra note 66, at 350; Favelas in Rio de Janeiro, Past and Present, BROWN
U. LIBR., http://library.brown.edu/create/fivecenturiesofchange/chapters/chapter-9/favelas-inrio-de-janeiro-past-and-present (last visited July 17, 2016).
192 See Sandra Jovchelovitch, Life and Death in the Favelas of Brazil, LSE CONNECT, Summer
2012, at 11, 11, http://www.lse.ac.uk/alumni/LSEConnect/pdf/summer2012/Life-and-death-inthe-favelas-of-Brazil.pdf.
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activities. 193 Thus, for example, the narrow streets with convoluted and
randomly created passageways—all of which often lack a formal
address, making them nearly impossible to find for anyone not part of
the favela community—created a hospitable environment for the gangs
to conduct their activities undetected by the police forces and to win
outright confrontations with rival gangs or law enforcement officials. 194
The takeover of the favelas by armed gangs had a significant impact on
the development of property rights in the favelas—an effect that
reverberates to this day. 195
As favelas grew, the life within them began to be organized—first
completely informally and then with some quasi-recognition from the
government. 196 As the favelas began to grow, there was often a need to
expand existing property or to buy a bigger house for an expanding
family. 197 A mechanism developed to facilitate these transactions outside
of the regular business of real estate because neither buyers nor sellers
legally owned that which they were buying and selling and there were no
legally recognized means to verify whether the person selling the
dwelling indeed owned it—even in the colloquial sense of the word. 198
The favela communities organized into residents’ associations—a form
of local self-government responsible for the inner workings of the
favelas. 199 It is both curious and understandable that favelas were
required to have formal associations starting in the 1960s—for example,
during the time of the second military government. 200 It is curious
because the military government’s goal was eradication rather than
regularization of favelas, 201 whereas requiring any sort of formal
structure would seem to be contrary to such goals. On the other hand,
because control of the population (including that living in the favelas)

Id.
Id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13. During an interview with a
president of one of the favelas’ residents’ associations, he explained that although “all have a
name and number . . . it’s made up and it’s not official. And the main thing is they haven’t got a
zip code . . . you don’t have an official address where you can receive a letter, for example. Folks
can find you, but within the communities.” Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at
42.
195 See generally PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144.
196 See generally Boaventura de Sousa Santos, The Law of the Oppressed: The Construction
and Reproduction of Legality in Pasargada, 12 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 118−19 (1977) (describing
the rise of the residents’ associations).
197 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13.
198 See William Twining, Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective, 20 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 473, 493 (2010).
199 Sousa Santos, supra note 196, at 118–19.
200 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13.
201 See supra notes 170–74 and accompanying text.
193
194
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was the junta’s paramount goal, 202 creating structures that would make
such control easier made perfect sense. 203
The residents’ associations, each headed by a president, “are the
internal arm of local authority, the liaison between the community and
the government and the voice of the favela community in public
matters,” and “are authorized to act with some degree of public
authority within their own territories.”204 As such, these entities are
indispensable for real estate transactions within the community. 205 The
elected officials of the association would verify that the person selling
the real estate was in fact the one that “owned” it, and would also record
the buyer as a new “owner.” 206 These verifications could be
accomplished with relative ease because everyone involved (buyer,
seller, and the verifying official) was part of the same community and
knew each other. 207 In this environment, further assurances were often
unnecessary. 208
Indeed, the informal (or to be charitable, semi-formal) system of
real estate transactions worked fairly well for the residents of a given
community. 209 While the transactions in the favelas do not fully match
those in the city proper, they are comparable. 210 Engaging in real estate
transactions in Brazil within the formal city boundaries is somewhat
similar to engaging in real estate transactions in the United States,
though perhaps not as technologically advanced. A person wishing to
buy real estate in Brazil would check the local newspapers, look for
locally distributed fliers, or listen to “word of mouth.” 211 As of late,
websites also have become a source of information. 212 The buyer then
contacts a licensed real estate agent that is listed in the advertisement
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
See Sousa Santos, supra note 196, at 42.
204 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13.
205 See id. at 13–14, 17; Twining, supra note 198, at 493.
206 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 17. In an interview with the president of a
residents’ association, the president explained that “if there was someone buying or selling they
had a paper, just a sheet of paper, with a header of the residents’ association saying who was
buying and who was selling and the president signed it,” and would also enter the transaction
“into the association[’s own] register.” Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27.
207 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27 (“There’s nobody that could
walk up and say, ‘It’s mine,’ because they knew exactly who built it, who lived there, who lived
afterwards, who their relatives were. And their neighbors and witnesses as well.”).
208 Id. at 26–27.
209 Id. at 27.
210 Compare PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 9–11, with id. at 11–20.
211 See id. at 9. While the “word of mouth” method of finding real estate may seem to be
overly informal, it is not unusual in the United States, either, where properties are often sold
without ever formally being on the market. Indeed, one of the authors of this Article bought
real estate in this very manner within the past year.
212 Id. at 9.
202
203
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and the transaction proceeds in much the same way as it would in the
United States. 213 Once the sale is consummated, the real estate agent
helps in formalizing and registering the transaction. All real estate
transactions within the formal city are registered in the cartórios which
then serve as a repository of information on ownership of any given lot
of land, performing roughly the same function as American county
clerks do. 214 A prospective buyer can therefore come and check to
ensure that the seller is indeed a true owner of the land, the taxes have
been paid, the proper permits have been obtained, etc. 215
None of this formality exists within the favelas, but parallel
processes emulate the transactions present within the city proper. These
processes, however, rely heavily on the leadership of the residents’
associations and the diligence of the elected representatives. 216 Neither
the licensed real estate agents nor the cartórios operate within the
favelas. 217 Cartórios do not register any favela real estate transactions
“since by definition, favelas are considered irregular dwellings given that
they were built without a construction permit, do not conform to
building code norms and occupy the land illegally.” 218 The licensed real
estate agents do not operate within the favelas largely for the same
reason—after all, the homes that they would be selling are not located
on “legally-owned property.” 219 Some better-located favelas do have
informal, unlicensed real estate brokers, but even those serve mainly
outsiders to the community. 220
Instead, a person wishing to buy or sell a house within the favela
would rely either on “word of mouth” or post a notice on a bulletin
board at the residents’ association’s office. 221 Once the seller and the
buyer have found each other, they complete their transaction with the
help of the residents’ association. 222 The residents’ association (though it
keeps records of its own) will ask the seller to prove that she is the
See id. at 9–10.
See id. at 11; see also Mitchell, supra note 186, at 570.
215 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11; see also CRISTIANA MOREIRA ET AL.,
PRACTICAL LAW, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE IN BRAZIL: OVERVIEW, Westlaw (database
updated Jan. 1, 2015); Andrew J. Dell’Olio, Public-Private Partnerships in Brazil: Opportunities
and Risks for Investors, INT’L L. PRACTICUM, Spring 2006, at 58, 61; Buying a House or Property
in Brazil, PALMAS TOCANTINS BRAZ. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.visitpalmas.com/archives/
buying-a-house-or-property-in-brazil.
216 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11–20; id. at 18 (noting that many
presidents used to be long-time community residents, but are now appointed and controlled by
drug lords); Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 26–28.
217 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 11, 13–14.
218 Id. at 11.
219 Id. at 13−14.
220 Id. at 14.
221 Id. at 12.
222 Id. at 16−18.
213
214
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rightful owner of the house, which may be a problem within older
favelas where housing has been built prior to the formation of the
residents’ associations and where the current owners who may have
inherited the property would have no paper to show the chain of
“title.” 223 In any event, the entire transaction is complete when the seller
and the buyer execute a transfer agreement, which is then signed by two
witnesses who attest that they know the seller to be the rightful owner,
and the president of the residents’ association signs and stamps the
document. 224 Similarly, the residents’ association would deal with
registering land that is inherited or otherwise transferred after a change
in family circumstances. 225 Additionally, because technically none of the
papers provided by the residents’ association are legal documents, as
they purport to transfer land that is not, in the eyes of the state, legally
occupied, the disputes over land ownership are not taken to law courts,
but are also resolved within and by the residents’ association. 226 From
the perspective of many favela residents, the system works fairly well. 227
However, it only works where the president (and other officers) of the
residents’ association are conscientious about their work, which is not
always the case. 228
With the arrival of the drug gangs, the arrangement partially broke
down. “Up until 1985, the president and officers of the Associations
were elected by the community and accountable to the community,” but
“[a]s the sale of drugs and arms increased, territorial control became
223 Id. at 16. However, because of the interwoven nature of the favela community, everyone
tends to know not only who lives there but also the status of her residence, i.e., whether it is
rented or owned. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 27 (“There’s nobody that
could walk up and say, ‘It’s mine,’ because they knew exactly who built it, who lived there, who
lived afterwards, who their relatives were. And their neighbors and witnesses as well.”).
224 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 17–18, 20; see also Dell’Olio, supra note 215, at
61 n.60. The parties to the transaction may also choose to verify the president’s signature at the
cartório, but such verification only serves to confirm that the president’s signature is indeed a
true signature. PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 18. The verification provided by the
cartório does not in any way register the transaction or ownership.
225 As was explained to us by a favela resident, the residents’ association provides the buyer
and a seller with a document signed and sealed by the president, and also records the
transaction in the association’s own books. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at
26–28. Nevertheless, none of this has the same formal status as a document verified by a notary
and recorded with the cartório. See supra note 224.
226 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 26–27. When asked what would
happen should there be a dispute regarding ownership of land, a favela resident replied that
“[p]eople would contact the [residents’] association and they would try to make it right.” Id. at
27. Nonetheless, a prospect of violence does exist as that resident recognized by following up
the previous explanation with suggesting that the parties to the dispute “could just fight.” Id.
227 See id. at 31.
228 See id. at 43. The interviewee cautioned that a lot depends on personal relations and
when those deteriorate, the internal favela processes cannot work anymore. It is also a problem
that in a number of favelas, presidents are controlled by local gangs, and therefore serve gangs’
interests. See id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13–14, 18.
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very lucrative and the drug gangs began to take over the Residents’
Associations by driving out or killing the elected presidents.” 229 The end
result is that today, the majority of favelas “are under the control of the
drug traffic.” 230 This situation persists even though in 2009, prompted
by the upcoming hosting of the World Cup and the Olympic Games, the
Brazilian government created Police Pacification Units (Unidades de
Polícia Pacificadora or UPPs) meant to clear out the gangs from the
favelas. 231 Generally, the UPPs have been considered to be successful in
increasing state presence in the favelas and have contributed to rising
land values in favelas and positive responses from residents and
community leaders. 232 Needless to say, the gang takeover of favelas
seriously undermined the interpersonal connections and the ability of
the residents of the favelas to engage in real estate transactions with
some modicum of assuredness over the status of the property being
transferred. 233 Furthermore, with the gang takeover, dispute resolution
within the favelas is often based on brute force rather than on any facts
or sense of fairness. 234
The final piece of the puzzle that is the “on the ground” situation in
the favelas is the Brazilian Constitution adopted during the transition to
the democratic regime. As discussed above, the drafters of Brazil’s
Constitution had a particular vision of the role of property rights in
society. The Constitution of 1988 simultaneously committed the
government to respect people’s property (including that in the favelas)
and gave the government the authority to remove people from the
favelas if the land was not, in the State’s opinion, being put to “rational
and adequate use.” 235 Additionally, the 1988 Constitution limited the
ability of the government to transfer the land to private parties, 236 which
in turn made the government’s ability to formally grant the land to
PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13.
Id. at 8.
231 Id.; Megan Corrarino, Note, “Law Exclusion Zones”: Mega-Events as Sites of Procedural
and Substantive Human Rights Violations, 17 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 180, 197 (2014).
232 Chegada da UPP à Tijuca Pode Valorizar Imóveis no Bairro em até 40%, Dizem
Especialistas, O GLOBO (Nov. 1, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://oglobo.globo.com/economia/imoveis/
chegada-da-upp-tijuca-pode-valorizar-imoveis-no-bairro-em-ate-40-dizem-especialistas3012765.
233 Enrique Desmond Arias & Corinne Davis Rodrigues, The Myth of Personal Security:
Criminal Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro’s Favelas, 48 LATIN AM. POL.
& SOC’Y 53, 71–73 (2006).
234 Id.; see also PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 18 (“[I]n more than one case, the
Residents’ Association was burned down and all records lost when the drug traffic took control
from the elected President.”); Anthony, supra note 66, at 350; Interview with Favela Residents,
supra note 145, at 44 (describing how if drug gangs wanted someone’s house, they would just
take it, with or without minor “compensation”).
235 C.F. art. 186 (Braz.); see also supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
236 C.F. art. 183 (Braz.).
229
230
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favela residents (to the extent that the houses sit on government- rather
than privately-owned land) problematic. 237
The conglomeration of these rules, together with the problems of
gang violence, poverty, lack of education, etc., is what the favelas and the
Brazilian government are facing as they attempt to regularize the legal
status of favela properties. Over the past several decades, the Brazilian
government attempted to create several programs that aimed to
regularize and legalize the legal rights inside the favelas. These
programs, however, can in many ways be described as “one step
forward, two steps back,” because oftentimes, what they gave with one
hand they took away with another. Additionally, local programs are
often short-lived due to shifts in political agendas. 238 For example, in
1985 the government in Rio de Janeiro proposed a five-year plan that
would fully incorporate favelas into the city and have them all receive
real neighborhood services such as street paving and lighting. 239 Yet the
program never got past the initial planning because the government
failed to give financial support to the City, and there also happened to
be a flood a year later. 240 As a result, all city funds went toward
cleanup. 241 Nonetheless, various levels of Brazilian government continue
to attempt to regularize life in the favelas.
The first comprehensive program known as Favela-Bairro began in
1994 and continues to this day. 242 The goal of the program was to
integrate favelas with the city proper. 243 The purpose of the program was
“to incorporate the favelas into the city with extension of infrastructure
and public spaces and the regularization of property ownership.” 244 The
program was meant to extend legal utilities into the favelas as well as to
create public spaces like plazas, wider streets, and other amenities. 245 In
some sense, the project is quite successful and laudable. It succeeded in
bringing some of the promised improvements to the few favelas where
the program was undertaken. Nonetheless, some of these improvements
were at the cost of depriving existing favela residents of their homes
(and relocating them elsewhere, though usually within the same favela).
In the favela of Santa Marta, for example, the City government planned
237 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 44–45 (discussing how there are
limits on whom the federal government can transfer land to); see also Smith, supra note 148, at
34–35.
238 See, e.g., PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 8, 24, 30–31.
239 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 274.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id. at 275; PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26.
243 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 275; PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26.
244 White, supra note 54, at 320.
245 See Smith, supra note 148, at 24.
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and attempted “a complete urbanization project . . . involv[ing] two lifts,
one on each side of the favela, the opening of streets for cars, and
investment in the houses.” 246 This was a multi-purpose, ambitious
project. It was supposed
to invest in the houses that were extremely full, so they’re wooden
houses and they also have a quite precarious situation, for example
the people that live in basements in the favela. And then the other
point would be to create more ventilation, more room for air in parts
of the favela where . . . there’s no air running around. . . . And then
the third point that they were going to pass on was in the drainage
system . . . . 247

Although the project did not live up to its original plans, some
improvements were made. 248 Yet, as a result, the government had “to
relocate [the affected] famil[ies] but [they were] promised that they
[would] stay in the favela.” 249 And the number of families removed and
relocated is significant. By some estimates, in Santa Marta alone, 100
families would have had to be relocated in 2004, but because the project
was not completed, and the favela continued to grow, today, if the
government were to complete the project as initially planned, the
number of families subject to relocation would be close to 300. 250
Furthermore, the Favela-Bairro program suffers from two
additional and interwoven problems. First, “[d]espite the construction
of paved plazas at the entrance to many of the participating favelas, no
one is in doubt as to where the formal city (called the asfalto or paved
city) ends and the informal city (called the morro or hillside) begins.”251
This clear delineation allows for the favelas to “remain highly
stigmatized territories of exclusion,” with the “discrimination against
favela residents [exceeding that] against dark-skinned people, women,
migrants from rural areas or any other” group. 252 It is not surprising that
the line between the favelas and the city proper remains as bright as
ever. 253 One of the reasons is that the various improvement projects are
not only too small in scale, but are also carried out in fits and starts. 254
The problem is that the implementation of various plans is dependent
Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 22.
Id. at 24.
248 Id. As one resident put it “a lot was done but we still have just a little bit of each problem.
They didn’t solve any of them completely. That’s the main problem of all organization projects
in the favelas is really that they’re never complete, they always get interrupted.” Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26.
252 Id.
253 See id.
254 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 24.
246
247
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on the political will of elected officials. Thus, for example in Santa Marta
“the mayor [who negotiated the improvement project with the favela
residents] lost the election and the new mayor came and he was [in]
opposition. And that was the end of that agreement.” 255 Luckily, in that
case the State government took responsibility of the project and saw to it
that it was not completely abandoned. 256 Nonetheless, the initial plan to
fully integrate Santa Marta into the city, much like other Favela-Bairro
plans, did not succeed. 257
To address these disparities, in 2010, Rio authorities expanded
Favela-Bairro and named the expansion Morar Carioca (which roughly
translates to “to live as someone from Rio de Janeiro”). 258 The goal
remained the same—to re-urbanize and socially integrate all of the city’s
favelas by 2020, 259 by providing housing units, infrastructure,
landscaping, improvement of sanitation systems, implementation of
leisure and educational programs, and more. 260 Though formally an
extension of the Favela-Bairro program, Morar Carioca was conceived
as the most ambitious that Rio de Janeiro has seen and as a key part of
the legacy of the 2016 Olympics. 261 When field research took place in
2012, architects and urban planners felt a need for quick action and
experienced excitement. 262 They hoped that the Morar Carioca model
would even out the differences in the type of urban infrastructure and
level of service provision various dwellers experienced. 263 In December
2010, the outcome of the Institute of Brazilian Architects (IAB) design
contest was released and forty architecture firms were chosen to mediate
Id. at 23.
Id.
257 Id. In describing the present-day state of affairs, the resident contrasted Santa Marta with
the “formal city” thus:
255
256

[I]n the formal city, you have order and you have to respect it, and here nobody is
checking it. So if the state played the same role of checking in the favela as they check
in the formal city then you prevent that, but the problem is the state only comes to
the favela to reprimand or to remove people. They are not doing the natural control,
ordering that they do in the formal city.
Id. at 25–26.
258 See Kate Steiker-Ginzberg, Morar Carioca: The Dismantling of a Dream Favela
Upgrading Program, RIOONWATCH (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=17687.
259 Paula Alvarado, The Urbanization of Rio de Janeiro’s Slums, a Model for Sustainable
Development, TREEHUGGER (June 12, 2012), https://www.treehugger.com/urban-design/theurbanization-of-rio-de-janeiro-s-slums-a-model-for-sustainable-development.html; Helen
Walters, Four Commandments for Cities of the Future: Eduardo Paes at TED2012, TEDBLOG
(Feb. 29, 2012, 9:49 PM), http://blog.ted.com/four-commandments-for-cities-of-the-futureeduardo-paes-at-ted2012.
260 See Steiker-Ginzberg, supra note 258.
261 Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
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in specific favela “groupings.” 264 “The first group of eleven firms were
contracted in June 2012 and began performing qualitative diagnostics in
the communities with the support of iBase,” a non-governmental
organization (NGO) that was employed by the Municipal Secretary of
Housing (SMH) “to hold participatory meetings and collect residents’
demands.” 265 The City, however, “cut iBase’s contract in January 2013,
financially dismantling the projects.” 266 Despite the fact that individual
parts of the project are still in progress, the plan to integrate the favelas
within the context of the Olympics has faded because both the funding
and the participatory structures targeted a completion goal of 2016. 267
When Mayor Eduardo Paes “was questioned about Morar Carioca at an
event in 2013, he cited lack of financial resources.” 268 Architects and
urban planners blame a shift in political agendas, and the way that
politicians balanced different priorities and competing interests that
resulted in the dismantling of the program. 269
The next program meant to help the residents of the favelas, known
as Minha Casa, Minha Vida (My Home, My Life), is equally a mixed
bag. The goal of the program is to allow poor working families to obtain
credit to buy a home. 270 However, the property for which a mortgage
can be obtained “must be formally registered with legal land title and
must show proof of paying property taxes.” 271 Almost definitionally, this
requirement excludes homes within favelas as those homes are not
“formally registered with legal land title,” and often cannot “show proof
of paying property taxes.” 272 Furthermore, the mortgage amount is
rather modest, meaning that the only non-favela housing that would
qualify would be on the city’s outskirts far from their work. 273 Thus,
favela residents (especially of those favelas that are centrally located) are
loath to trade their illegal, convenient abode for a legal, very
inconvenient one. 274

Id.
Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.; see also Stefan Johnson, Providência’s Cable Car Launch: Urban Mobility or Tourism?,
RIOONWATCH (July 1, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=16464.
268 Steiker-Ginzberg, supra note 258.
269 Id.
270 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 26.
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 16.
264
265
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Toward Individual Titling and Ownership

All of this leads to the discussion of the programs aimed at
empowering residents of the favelas to improve their own lot by giving
them ownership rights to their houses and the land on which the houses
stand. The idea is that once acquired, such rights would be subject to
traditional market forces and not be dependent on the political winds or
the necessity to trade convenience for legalization. This Section will
attempt to describe these efforts, as well as the barriers to the realization
of the program.
The first efforts to provide favela residents with title to their land
actually began quite early. In 1984, during the time of transition from
military to civilian rule, Leonel Brizola, the then-governor of the State of
Rio de Janeiro, announced the Cada Familia, Um Lote (A Plot for Every
Family) program. 275 As conceived, the program was quite ambitious.
The original plan involved titling 400,000 lots, improving the
infrastructure of another 400,000, and creating 200,000 new lots to
account for the in-country immigration into Rio. 276 The final outcome
of the program, which ran for only three years, was much more modest,
with only 23,000 lots being transferred into private ownership.277
However, the program did bequeath Brazil an important innovation. As
part of the Cada Familia, Um Lote, the government created a semipublic entity to which publicly held land could be transferred consistent
with the law on alienation of public land. 278 This entity, known by its
Portuguese acronym CEHAB-RJ, continues to exist and is now a
nominal title-holder for vast swaths of land. 279 These holdings affect
how today’s titling process proceeds.
The current land titling process is best illustrated by the example of
the Cantagalo Project, named after an eponymous favela near the
upscale neighborhoods of Ipanema and Copacabana. 280 While there are
other programs, the Cantagalo Project is illustrative of both the process
for title regularization and the difficulties that arise in the course of this
endeavor.

Smith, supra note 148, at 27.
Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 271; see, e.g., Smith, supra note 148, at 29–30 (“The
title investigation revealed that while much of the land was held by the state, 18,505m2 was held
by CEHAB, a semi-public company created as part of the Cada Familia, Um Lote discussed
above to administer the transfer of land occupied by favelas to the residents of the communities
themselves.”).
280 Smith, supra note 148, at 29.
275
276
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The Cantagalo Project began in 2008 with attorneys acting on
behalf of the entire community of Cantagalo filing a usucapião (an
equivalent to adverse possession) claim against CEHAB-RJ, which holds
a large portion of the land on which this particular favela sits. 281 Under
the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, “a possessor who can demonstrate
uninterrupted, uncontested possession of land for a period of time [can]
gain title to that land.” 282 Usually, for possessors who used the land for
residential purposes and believed themselves to be true owners of the
land in question, the period is five years. 283 What is particularly
interesting is that the Brazilian adverse possession process (the
usucapião) can be invoked not just by individuals, but also by groups
and communities. 284 This is what happened at the first stage of the
Cantagalo Project—the Cantagalo favela asserted adverse possession
over the land on which it sat as a community rather than as individual
land occupiers. 285
As in the United States, the Brazilian adverse possession process is
a judicial one. 286 To begin the process, the land in question must be
defined. 287 This is where proceeding as a community makes things
easier, but where ultimately giving title to a particular individual or
family becomes quite complicated. 288 In the Cantagalo favela, the
residents’ association, working together with Instituto Atlântico (a nonprofit public policy organization) secured the services of a pro bono
attorney who “conducted a topographical analysis of the community, a
formal census of all community members, and an investigation to
identify the actual title holders of the lands occupied by the
community.” 289 This was by no means a small undertaking. Finally, with
the results in hand, in 2009 the case was brought before a Brazilian
court. 290 It is important to observe that the defendant in the case was
CEHAB-RJ, rather than the State or a private party. 291 Having CEHABRJ—an entity established decades earlier with the specific mandate to
transfer title to the favela residents—in many ways made all the
Id. at 28.
Id. at 30. See generally C.F. arts. 183, 191 (Braz.) (outlining the procedures and
requirements for establishing usucapião).
283 See discussion supra notes 80–100.
284 Smith, supra note 148, at 32.
285 Id. at 32–33.
286 See Alexandre dos Santos Cunha, Informal Land Subdivision and Real Estate
Regularization: A Comparative Study Between Colombia and Brazil, 40 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 315, 321−22 (2009); Smith, supra note 148, at 30.
287 See Smith, supra note 148, at 36.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 29.
290 Id. at 30.
291 Id. at 29−30.
281
282
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difference. 292 The Brazilian Constitution denies anyone the ability to
adversely possess as against the government 293—a doctrine that is also
present in American law. 294 Thus, had the land in the Cantagalo favela
been owned by the State, it may have been impossible to bring the
action to acquire possession. 295 Had the land been owned by a private
party, there may well have been a more contentious litigation process.
But with the land owned by CEHAB-RJ, and taking into account that
the residents’ association conducted extensive preliminary negotiations
and consultations before filing suit to essentially quiet title, the suit
proceeded rather smoothly and without much adversity, 296 if still at
glacial pace. 297
The court proved receptive to the claims by the residents’
association, 298 though the fact that there still does not appear to be a
final judgment seven years later is indicative of the difficulty of the
process. 299 However, as it turned out, not all land on which the favela
stands was owned by CEHAB-RJ. 300 Some land was still owned by the
State itself, 301 and therefore was not included in the usucapião process. 302
At the same time, there is an ability to obtain a “concession” (rather
than full title) “that grants the possessor limited rights of use and
occupation.” 303 To obtain such a concessionary right, the applicant must
show 1) “five-year[s of] uninterrupted and uncontested possession or
urban land”; 2) that the applicant is an “individual or individuals of low
income”; 3) “use of land for residential purposes”; and 4) “possession of
no other rural or urban properties.” 304 Despite the alienability of
concessionary title, including through mortgage, 305 there are several
limitations. First, the concession can only be transferred to another
person meeting the income restrictions. 306 Second, the holder of a
Id. at 28−30, 33.
C.F. art. 183 (Braz.).
294 See generally Walter Quentin Impert, Comment, Whose Land Is It Anyway?: It’s Time to
Reconsider Sovereign Immunity from Adverse Possession, 49 UCLA L. REV. 447 (2001).
295 See Smith, supra note 148, at 32. See generally C.F. art. 183 (Braz.) (“Public real estate
shall not be acquired by prescription.”).
296 Smith, supra note 148, at 29.
297 The case was initially filed in 2009, yet by 2016, only forty-four families had received title.
See Project Cantagalo: Overview, INSTITUTO ATLÂNTICO, http://www.atlantico.org.br/en/
projetos/cantagalo/apresentacao (last visited July 26, 2016).
298 Smith, supra note 148, at 30, 33–34.
299 See supra note 297.
300 Smith, supra note 148, at 29.
301 Id.
302 See id. at 31–33.
303 Id. at 32.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57–58.
292
293
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concessionary title can only use it as his own residence. 307 On the other
hand, the concessionary title may be easier to obtain as it does not
require a full-blown judicial process, but rather somewhat abbreviated
administrative procedures. 308 Nonetheless, the administrative process
has its own limitations. As the president of one of the residents’
associations explained during a conversation, before invoking the
administrative process, the claimants
have to do topography and all the land research, not just who the
owner is but all the research that it’s not an area of risk, if it’s got
minimum infrastructure, and the law terms that the land has to have
at least two types of minimum infrastructure, so streets, sewage,
public lighting, and water supply. 309

That is why favelas that benefited from the Favela-Bairro program
discussed above, which widened streets and improved the
infrastructure, 310 are in a better position to succeed in the administrative
process than the ones where the level of squalor is higher. 311
It should also be noted that, at least in the state of Rio de Janeiro,
the Constitution has been amended to allow the use of the shorter
administrative process to seek land donation (rather than
concession). 312 Unlike adverse possession judicial actions, however, the
donation through the administrative procedure is a negotiated process
where the government has to agree to donate and can impose conditions
on the donation. 313 The recourse to these administrative proceedings is
the second phase of the Cantagalo Project. 314
The Cantagalo Project illuminates both the opportunities to
achieve land regularization and the roadblocks on the way to that goal.
In terms of opportunities, as already mentioned, the Cantagalo Project
spurred the government of Rio de Janeiro not only to begin the land
transfer process, but also to change the law to allow for quicker and
easier procedures. 315 The Cantagalo Project has also been emulated in
Smith, supra note 148, at 33.
Id. at 28, 34−35; Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57–63.
309 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 60.
310 See supra notes 244–48 and accompanying text.
311 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 19 (discussing how the Favela-Bairro
program, though it ended up being little help in terms of obtaining full title, allowed residents
to obtain a “permit of occupancy”); id. at 15 (“The favelas which were upgraded by the FavelaBairro Program . . . have the lowest risk of removal.”).
312 Smith, supra note 148, at 34–35; Project Cantagalo: Finalized Stages, INSTITUTO
ATLÂNTICO, http://www.atlantico.org.br/en/projetos/cantagalo/etapas-concluidas (last visited
July 26, 2016).
313 UN-HABITAT, LAND TENURE, HOUSING RIGHTS AND GENDER IN BRAZIL 43–44 (2005);
Smith, supra note 148, at 35.
314 Smith, supra note 148, at 28.
315 Id. at 34.
307
308
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other favelas, with residents and/or residents’ associations seeking title
to the land on which their homes sit. 316 At the same time, the Cantagalo
Project laid bare the Herculean scope of the effort. As of the day of this
writing in 2017 the adverse possession case that began in 2008 has yet to
reach final judgment. 317 Furthermore, thus far only forty-four out of
over 9000 residents have received title to their land. 318 And all of this
was under the most favorable of conditions. The Cantagalo Project is
somewhat unique in that it
was nurtured and supported by private entities in the formal
sector. . . . [T]he initial impetus of the project was a collaboration
between the residents’ association of Cantagalo with the Instituto
Atlântico and representatives from the wealthy neighborhood of
Ipanema. The influence of the latter two groups and their ability to
marshal resources cannot be underestimated nor assumed as a given
in future projects. 319

The reason why the financial support is so critical to the
regularization procedure stems from the very first requirement for the
process to begin. Before any judicial or administrative claims can be
filed, the property in question must be surveyed, the residents and their
length of stay ascertained, plots mapped, and any possible disputes
between residents laying claim to the same land resolved. 320 The costs of
such an undertaking for every favela and every resident are enormous. 321
Absent significant infusion of funds from the State or private entities, it
is unlikely that significant progress could be made. 322
The lack of affordable counsel to represent the favela residents and
the backlogs in the judicial system are additional significant problems
that greatly slow down the process of regularization. 323 Although there
have been some improvements on this front, the backlog continues to
stretch back years. 324
See id. at 35; supra note 312 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 297–99 and accompanying text.
318 See Smith, supra note 148, at 29 (noting that the Cantagalo favela has a population of
9000 residents); supra note 297.
319 Smith, supra note 148, at 37.
320 Id. at 36.
321 Id.
322 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 58 (“[Favela residents and
communities] always had to rely on the work of the public lawyers and the public lawyers are
already overloaded. . . . [R]esearch . . . shows that 87% of all lawsuits in Rio rely on the works of
these public lawyers, so with that the process was very slow.”); cf. Smith, supra note 148, at 37.
323 Smith, supra note 148, at 36–37.
324 PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 12 (“The city office of the Attorney General is
in charge of these [regularization] cases, and has an interminable backlog of pending cases.
There is no end in sight until a new system is put into place. So far, that has not happened even
with the ambitious squatter upgrading program, Favela-Bairro.”); Interview with Favela
316
317
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Even if one were to consider only collective regularization rather
than individual titling, the Cantagalo favela is better situated than many
of its counterparts. This particular favela has the advantage of having
been “pacified” by the UPP. 325 This means that the residents’ association
was in charge and could represent residents’ best interests in its
interactions with CEHAB-RJ and the government. The same cannot be
said for other favelas that remain gang-controlled. 326 Even if those
favelas were to begin the same process, it is unlikely that the interaction
with the government and other officials would be nearly as fruitful as
they were in Cantagalo’s case. 327
Finally, it should be observed that the laws undergirding the
regularization process also tend to limit it. As mentioned above,
oftentimes a number of conditions must be satisfied for individuals to
obtain title from the government. 328 One of those conditions is that the
land in question be used for residential purposes only, which is not the
case for all land in the favelas.
In some instances an individual will acquire informal title to a
number of properties within a favela and will rent out the properties
as an informal, off-site “landlord.” More frequent is the case in which
an occupying family rents out part of their house or sells the right for
another family to occupy and build on their roof. 329

In these situations, the title may be transferred to the favela
community, but perhaps not to the individual. 330 This in turn limits the
full alienability of land. 331 Similarly, downstream transfers may be
constrained to individuals within a certain income level. 332 Such
restrictions are not uncommon in cities such as New York City, 333 which

Residents, supra note 145, at 2 (noting that at best it takes six months to process a single claim,
whereas thousands of people are waiting).
325 Smith, supra note 148, at 29.
326 See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 13 (“Today, the majority of favelas are
under the control of the drug traffic.”).
327 See Smith, supra note 148, at 38 (discussing unique features of the Cantagalo favela).
328 See supra notes 303–07 and accompanying text.
329 Smith, supra note 148, at 37 (citation omitted).
330 Compare id. at 34 (noting that the administrative claim can be brought collectively), with
id. at 37−38 (discussing limitations to acquisitions of land by someone who rents rather than
lives on it).
331 See id. at 33.
332 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 58.
333 See N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 576(1)(b) (McKinney 2015) (limiting purchase of
certain properties to “persons or families whose probable aggregate annual income does not
exceed six times the rental”).
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also limits the alienability and marketability of the land, 334 making it
potentially not worth it for people to regularize their possessions.
C.

Residents’ Concerns About Regularization

Before turning to the next Part of this Article, two additional
observations about the current state of affairs in the regularization
efforts should be made. First, during our interviews with the residents of
the favelas, it became quite evident that the complexity of the
regularization process is confusing to them and that they are not certain
of what rights they would acquire at any given stage of the process. The
clearest example of this was the confusion over two types of documents
that the residents can acquire. One is referred to as a posse and another
one is escritura. The escritura is a formal deed, and the rights associated
with it are the same as with any deed on any piece of property within the
city proper. 335 The posse, on the other hand, is much more amorphous
or is at least perceived as such. The posse is a document that recognizes
the holder’s tenure on land. 336 The tenure recognition is important for
the adverse possession five-year clock to begin ticking. 337 Perceptions of
the posse, however, vary wildly between different favela residents. Thus,
during one conversation a favela resident, when asked “What has
changed for the people who have obtained posse?,” replied: “[N]othing.
Because . . . what makes [a difference] is when you have the [escritura],
so when you have the posse nothing has changed.” 338 Another resident
said that “posse doesn’t have a legal meaning.”339 On the other hand,
another resident explained that posse is indeed a legal document that

334 See Michelle Higgins, Bargains with a ‘but’: Affordable New York Apartments with a
Catch, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/29/realestate/affordablenew-york-apartments-with-a-catch.html (“[S]ome of the city’s most affordable apartments
[are] struggling to find buyers . . . because they belong to a small and quirky breed of co-op that
requires buyers to meet income caps . . . .”).
335 Jose Santiago, The Closing Process in Brazil, GRINGOES, http://www.gringoes.com/theclosing-process-in-brazil (last visited Apr. 28, 2017). The escritura is important because, as one
of the favela residents stated, “when you have the escritura, if you want to get your house better,
do constructions, you can . . . [g]et a loan from the bank.” Interview with Favela Residents,
supra note 145, at 7. Furthermore, if the government were to evict an escritura holder using its
eminent domain powers, the owner who has an escritura “will be paid by the land and the
house. And, if they don’t have the escritura, they just get money from the house.” Id.
336 According to one resident’s understanding of the process: “When you see somebody
living like the owner then you can say that this person has the posse,” but not the right to the
title. Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 56.
337 See discussion supra notes 81–100.
338 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 6.
339 Id. at 32.
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confirms a concessionary title from the government. 340 He explained
that posse came into being in the 1980s “because the law still says that
public land could not be donated to private people,” and to comply with
that formality, “[the government] started the whole posse title,” which
was in turn “valid for 99 years.” 341
It appears that the mass confusion over the meaning and value of
the posse title stems from the different rules for regularizing land title
depending on who happens to be the owner of record and on the rather
Byzantine and interminable process of regularization. For nongovernment land, it seems that posse is indeed an intermediate step
toward full title embodied by the escritura. 342 The posse proves that the
person holding it is in possession of the land described in the document
and begins the ticking of the clock on the five-year adverse possession
statute of limitations, but does not in and of itself confer the right of
ownership. 343 Conversely, when the land in question is government
owned, escritura cannot be obtained, because government land cannot
be transferred to private ownership 344 (or at least could not be until the
previously discussed state constitutional amendment which permits
donation, but not adverse possession 345). Thus, the posse serves a
function of a title for the concessionary transfer. 346 The confusion,
however caused, results in the favela residents losing faith in the
regularization process. Thus, one resident commented that though “an
NGO actually come[s] and do[es] the surveys and all the work and all
the documents, but people didn’t even bother picking up the posse
documents,” choosing to rely instead on the informal documents
received from the residents’ association. 347 Such attitudes present a
significant barrier to regularization of ownership in the favelas, but they
may abate if the procedures become faster, more transparent, and more
understandable to the average layperson.
340 Id. at 43–44; see also Brazil Property Guide: Key Facts and Markets, NUWIRE INV. (Dec.
19, 2008), http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/brazil-property-guide-key-facts-and-markets.
341 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 41, 43.
342 Id. at 3–4, 6, 32.
343 Id. at 66–67 (explaining that it takes a long time to acquire documents needed to obtain
posse and then once posse is in hand, the five-year clock for adverse possession, and ultimately
escritura begins ticking). However, even when the five years are up, there may still be a
protracted legal process to get the land by adverse possession. See supra notes 297−99, 323−24
and accompanying text.
344 C.F. art. 183 (Braz.).
345 See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
346 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 57, 83 (explaining that under the
concessionary regime, no escritura is ever granted, and posse “title” is evidence of concession);
see also Smith, supra note 148, at 32 (noting that “a government concession . . . grants the
possessor limited rights of use and occupation,” rather than title).
347 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 31.
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The second observation that we made was the unease of a number
of favela residents with regularization as a whole, aside from the
particular procedures to achieve it. 348 The concerns were two-fold. First,
the residents worried about the gentrification of the favelas, especially
those located in the central and desirable areas of Rio. 349 They
understand that once individuals have proper registerable title to their
land, they would no longer be limited to selling within the favela
community and with the approval of the residents’ association.350
Instead, the newly titled individuals would be able to sell to anyone able
and willing to pay the market price for the lot. 351 If such a practice
becomes widespread, some residents believe that the very people whom
the regularization process was supposed to help would end up priced
out of their own neighborhoods and the favela problem would simply be
pushed to a new location, with the cycle repeating itself. 352 The second
concern is that regularization would also bring with it new obligations,
including paying real estate taxes 353 and obeying the various building
codes. 354
While there is not necessarily objection to the payment of taxes as
such, much depends on where a given favela is located. For example, as
one of our interviewees observed, the favela of “Santa Marta is in the
south of the city”—“the most expensive part of the city”—and, unless
special designations are made, the tax imposed on the residents of Santa
Marta may become unaffordable. 355 Similarly, the residents are
concerned that the building codes and permits currently inapplicable to
favelas will start operating with full force as part of the regularization
process. 356 The problem is that although such codes apply in the city
348 Id. at 10–11 (expressing the concern that “the biggest problem in terms of regularization
is gentrification” since “once you have the property . . . anybody of the city can buy your area”);
Smith, supra note 148, at 38 (noting that “[t]here may also be elements within the favelas which
oppose formal titling” for various—including nefarious—reasons).
349 See Jo Griffin, Olympic Exclusion Zone: The Gentrification of a Rio Favela, GUARDIAN
(June 15, 2016, 6:37 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/jun/15/rio-olympicsexclusion-zone-gentrification-favela-babilonia.
350 See generally Christopher Gaffney, The Blind Hand of the Market, GEOSTADIA (May 2,
2014, 12:39 PM), http://geostadia.blogspot.com/2014/05/the-blind-hand-of-market.html.
351 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 11 (“[S]peculators are the first
ones that come and buy the land.”).
352 See Pindell, supra note 18, at 457; Smith, supra note 148, at 25−27.
353 See Marc R. Poirier, Brazilian Regularization of Title in Light of Moradia, Compared to
the United States Understandings of Homeownership and Homelessness, 44 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 259, 268 (2013).
354 See Perlman, Metamorphosis, supra note 189, at 176 (“Rio’s favela residents are mostly
opposed to regularization of land titles. They do not want to pay property taxes or submit to
building codes . . . .”).
355 Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 33.
356 Id. at 33–34.
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proper, the wealthier residents of the city can always find a way (legal or
not quite) to avoid particularly troublesome restrictions or to secure the
necessary permits. 357 The residents of favelas, with their lack of funds,
are not so fortunate. 358 Thus, it may be that the regularization will
disadvantage the newly minted formal owners by limiting their current
ability to expand or renovate their housing.
In short, the regularization process, though mostly welcomed by
the residents of the favelas, is not viewed as an unalloyed good, and the
favela residents do retain a number of concerns that also tend to retard
the process of regularization.
IV. PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF TITLE
A.

Removals for Large-Scale Sports Events

This Section describes how, while the informal property system in
the favelas may have worked for many intents and purposes, the
Brazilian government was able to seize land without much ado from the
many title-less residents when the government wanted to build largescale athletic facilities for the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics. In
the past decade, Brazilian officials have devoted significant resources to
cinching lucrative relationships with global athletic mega-events. 359 In
an effort to further Brazil’s newfound economic dexterity and
cosmopolitan standing, Rio de Janeiro has become the de facto epicenter
of ambitious projects with global organizations like FIFA and the
International Olympic Committee (IOC). 360 Brazil’s host city is
following the global trend of furthering international elite interests to
capitalize on the highly profitable sponsor influx and global spotlight. 361
The actions taken by Brazilian officials to revamp city infrastructure in
preparation for these large-scale events expose the complete lack of
recognition of the property rights of thousands of Brazilian favela
residents. 362
See PERLMAN, IT DEPENDS, supra note 144, at 21.
Id.
359 Corrarino, supra note 231, at 190–92.
360 Id.
361 Id. at 185–86.
362 Stefan Norgaard, Why the Olympics and Other Major Sporting Events Usually Increase
Inequality in the Host City, FORDFOUNDATION (Aug. 1, 2016), http://www.fordfoundation.org/
ideas/equals-change-blog/posts/why-the-olympics-and-other-major-sporting-events-usuallyincrease-inequality-in-the-host-city; Adam Talbot, Opinion, Rio 2016: Who Stands to Benefit
from a Successful Olympics?, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 30, 2016, 5:02 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/
rio-2016-who-stands-benefit-successful-olympics-453094.
357
358
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The organization of global sporting events, such as the Olympics
and World Cup, have an extensive history of exclusively benefitting the
elite and well-connected upper class of the host country. 363 In Brazil, the
2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics have been used pretextually for
Brazilian officials to initiate a “social cleansing” of prominent Rio de
Janeiro properties. 364 As substantial public investment funnels into new
infrastructure put in place for these major events, property prices of the
surrounding areas surge in response. 365
Human Rights Advisor of Amnesty International Brazil, Renata
Neder, suggested that the process of gentrification taking place
throughout Rio de Janeiro in anticipation of the 2014 World Cup and
2016 Olympics reveals how the government sees the city: “[I]t is no
longer a place for residents, but as a business to sell to foreign investors.
That’s what the World Cup is about.” 366 The opportunities for business
development in the wake of hosting a mega event are unprecedented in
terms of foreign interest in adjacent properties. 367 Brazil has capitalized
upon the lucrative, global limelight with utter disregard for the human
rights of its most vulnerable and indigent population. 368
As Rio de Janeiro infrastructure was put into place in preparation
for the World Cup and Olympics, the city’s real estate prices
skyrocketed. 369 The police pacification process, while improving safety,
also contributed to rising prices. For example, Vidigal was one of Rio’s
most notorious favelas before the City jailed many of the drug
traffickers previously in charge. 370 Real estate advocacy groups estimate
that within seventy-two hours of the police taking control of Vidigal, the
neighboring property prices rose by fifty percent, effectively pricing out
thousands of native families in the process. 371 The exodus of the original
poorer residents made the new wave of investor- and owner-occupied
real estate transactions possible. While some residents asserted that the
safer environment was due to the increased police presence in the
See Norgaard, supra note 362; Talbot, supra note 362.
Owen Gibson & Jonathan Watts, World Cup: Rio Favelas Being ‘Socially Cleansed’ in
Runup to Sporting Events, GUARDIAN (Dec. 5, 2013, 12:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/dec/05/world-cup-favelas-socially-cleansed-olympics.
365 Id.
366 Id.
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Francesca Steele, Brazil Property: Buyers Target Homes in Rio’s ‘Pacified’ Favelas, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/5a4c57ea-1612-11e3-a57d-00144fea
bdc0.html.
370 Nick Boulos, A Fresh Perspective on Rio from Its Most Notorious Favela, TELEGRAPH
(Aug. 4, 2016, 5:52 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/south-america/brazil/
articles/a-fresh-perspective-on-rio-from-one-of-its-most-notorious-favelas.
371 Steele, supra note 369.
363
364
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favelas, contentious property ownership disputes remained
commonplace. 372
In 2013, a local resident in the Vidigal area, Andreas Wieland,
“won a dispute over his ownership” of a popular Vidigal nightclub,
which he had bought in 2009 for $10,000. 373 Upon establishing his
ownership, he was promptly offered over $300,000 to sell it. 374 The
effects of the World Cup and Olympic planning exacerbated an already
precarious dichotomy of economic disparity and social development.
The cost of living rose as a result of Rio’s role as host city to these major
events. 375 While the construction boom intended to improve the urban
mobility crisis of Rio, the income inequality and construction issues
only compounded it. 376
While Brazilian officials offered safety concerns for the basis of the
forced evictions, this pretense falls flat as the actions taken by the
Brazilian officials revealed the true motivation. In defense of the City’s
widespread demolition of thousands of longstanding housing structures
for the most disenfranchised citizens, Rio de Janeiro’s housing secretary,
Jorge Bittar, said the demolition was part of a multi-million dollar
project to transform the area developed for the World Cup. 377 Bittar
justified the systematic demolitions as necessary to develop the land into
the epicenter of the World Cup festivities. 378 While the areas marked for
demolition lacked basic infrastructure, such as running water,
electricity, or school systems, the Rio de Janeiro housing authorities
prioritized the construction of lavish cultural centers, tree-lined plazas,
and cinemas. 379 Bittar recognized that the areas targeted for demolition
were very poor communities, but he blindly suggested that the forced
removals experienced by these residents were meant to offer the affected
families dignity. 380
Despite the noble reasoning that Rio de Janeiro authorities offered
for the forced removals, the ensuing rampant destruction devastated the
Id.
Id.
374 Id.
375 Vincent Bevins, Ipanema Has It All, Including Skyrocketing City Home Prices, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/20/greathomesanddestinations/20iht-reipan
ema20.html.
376 Paula Daibert, Brazil’s Evicted ‘Won’t Celebrate World Cup’, ALJAZEERA (May 26, 2014),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/05/brazil-evicted-won-celebrate-world-cup201452012437552695.html.
377 Tom Phillips, Rio World Cup Demolitions Leave Favela Families Trapped in Ghost Town,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2011, 10:57 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/26/favelaghost-town-rio-world-cup.
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 Id.
372
373
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livelihood of an entire sub-culture. 381 Favela residents reported waking
up to the demolition of their community without any prior indication,
resulting in thousands of residents living amongst the rubble of their
former communities. 382 When asked why city-sponsored demolition
began in favelas still inhabited, Bittar blamed a construction company
for not finishing new housing in time for the displaced inhabitants to
relocate. 383 While Rio de Janeiro’s government claimed that the
demolitions were necessary to rectify the unsafe living conditions of
favela residents, children were left to live and play amid the wreckage
that used to be their functioning community. 384
The Rio de Janeiro government undertook initial demolitions in
November 2010 to transform the area designated to become a parking
lot for the Maracanã Stadium. 385 Favela do Metrô, a Rio de Janeiro
community that was home to over 700 families, faced the brunt of the
lofty development goals of the City. 386 Seasonal workers, who eventually
established their own livelihoods and businesses in the favela,
constructed Favela do Metrô in the late 1970s. 387 By 2010, Favela do
Metrô was a self-governing community comprised of 126 small family
businesses. 388 It was common for several generations to live in one
structure within the favela, with that one structure providing not only
shelter, but also the livelihood for the entire family. 389 A family would
run a small business out of the first floor of its dwelling, offering income
security and housing for future generations. In a community with slight
public infrastructure, a family’s hand-constructed shelter was often the
only means to endure systemic poverty.
As the City began unannounced and sporadic rounds of
demolitions throughout Favela do Metrô, living conditions
disintegrated from the prior self-governed community. 390 Causing
widespread “panic and despair,” the City began demolition on inhabited
381 See NAT’L COALITION OF LOCAL COMMS. FOR A PEOPLE’S WORLD CUP & OLYMPICS,
MEGA-EVENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BRAZIL 13–14 (2012), http://
www.conectas.org/arquivos-site/Sumario_eng%20(1).pdf.
382 Id.
383 Phillips, supra note 377.
384 Id.
385 Elena Hodges, The World Cup Is Underway. What Has Become of Favela do Metrô?,
RIOONWATCH (June 21, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=16094l; Phillips, supra note 377.
386 Hodges, supra note 385.
387 Phillips, supra note 377.
388 Hodges, supra note 385.
389 See Susie Seefelt Lesieutre, From Favela to Bairro: Rio’s Neighborhoods in Transition,
DRCLAS NEWS (David Rockefeller Ctr. for Latin Am. Studies, Harvard Univ., Boston, Mass.),
Winter 2001, at 53, 53 (“Many times these favelas are home to generations of the same family.
Relocating them disrupts their already adverse lives, removing them from longstanding social
ties and jobs.”).
390 Hodges, supra note 385.
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homes, “some with the occupants’ belongings still inside.” 391 A fraction
of the most vulnerable residents were relocated to other housing over
forty miles away in Cosmos, West Zone. 392 Even those lucky enough to
accept resettlement offers faced extreme hardships, as the isolated
relocations offered few job prospects. 393 Because the City failed to
manage matters properly and displayed significant negligence, drug
users and criminal enterprises flocked to the half-demolished,
abandoned structures, followed by problems with mosquitos carrying
dengue as well as with rats. 394 Shortly thereafter, the City halted all
garbage disposal services throughout Favela do Metrô, worsening the
conditions for the remaining residents. 395 As the quality of life declined,
officials used the exact health concerns that initial demolitions had
caused to explain why more removals were necessary. 396
Countless Rio de Janeiro favelas faced systemic evictions at the
hands of the Brazilian government after centuries of low public
investment in infrastructure, and of the failure to recognize property
titles. 397 Even those families that consented to relocation to other areas
based on Rio officials’ promise of an improvement in their difficult
living conditions experienced violations of their rights along the way. 398
Residents were frequently coerced and threatened by Rio de Janeiro
officials to intimidate the residents into consenting to a meager
relocation package. 399 The minority of residents that were offered any
reparations whatsoever often were relocated to distant, isolated areas
with even less access to services and infrastructure than their previous
land had. 400 Those who accepted the government’s offer of resettlement
received compensation below the market price for their property.401
Brazil researchers received reports that favela residents who refused to
accept the meager compensation offers had effectively been forced out
of their communities after authorities initiated large-scale demolitions

391 Felicity Clarke, The Never-Ending Eviction: Demolition, Protest and Police Violence Once
Again Rock Favela do Metrô, RIOONWATCH (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=
12978.
392 Id.
393 See Douglas, supra note 8.
394 See Hodges, supra note 385.
395 Id.
396 Id.
397 See supra Part I.
398 See Daibert, supra note 376.
399 Ben Tavener, The Olympics Are Screwing Rio de Janeiro’s Poorest Citizens out of Housing,
VICE NEWS (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:40 PM), https://news.vice.com/article/the-olympics-are-screwingrio-de-janeiros-poorest-citizens-out-of-housing.
400 Daibert, supra note 376.
401 Id.
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of the favela communities, while hundreds of families had yet to be
relocated or remained. 402
Despite the destruction, hundreds of Favela do Metrô families who
declined to abandon their livelihoods were left to live in the semidemolished structures that remained in the construction’s wake.403
Other families with no other options remained in the construction site
for over three years while awaiting the promise of resettlement and
compensation. 404 The City’s complete disregard for the rights of the
favela residents left countless children, elderly, and pregnant women
with few options for resettlement. 405
Sporadic destruction and inconsistent construction ensued for
three years, until Rio de Janeiro police violently evicted those remaining
in the rubble of Favela do Metrô, with no prospect of compensation or
resettlement. 406 The police gave no justification for the militaristic
tactics employed to evict the remaining destitute families using rubber
bullets, pepper spray, and other similar techniques. 407
City authorities predicated the destruction of Favela do Metrô as
necessary due to its close proximity to the site of the Maracanã
Stadium. 408 The City’s plans for the favela property were never officially
disclosed, though the construction contracts indicated that the property
was to be developed into a parking lot and commercial strip for the
nearby stadium. 409 Ultimately, the mass destruction of Favela do Metrô
under the World Cup agenda was in vain, as neither a parking lot nor
any redevelopment of the site has occurred. 410 As of this writing,
abandoned construction materials are scattered throughout mountains
of rubble as the land remains unutilized. 411 The chaos and panic
inflicted under Rio de Janeiro authorities in Favela do Metrô has yet to
serve any purpose. 412
It is useful to delve into some of the history of Rio de Janeiro’s
selection as an Olympic and FIFA World Cup site before further
Phillips, supra note 377.
Id.; Hodges, supra note 385.
404 Clarke, supra note 391.
405 Phillips, supra note 377.
406 Hodges, supra note 385.
407 Id.
408 See Vinod Sreeharsha, Sporting Events Leave Rio’s Favela Residents Terrified, MIAMI
HERALD (Dec. 8, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/
americas/article4376989.html.
409 David Sim, Rio 2016: Favela Residents Refuse to Move out to Make Way for Olympic
Construction, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2015, 10:55 GMT), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/rio2016-favela-residents-refuse-move-out-make-way-olympic-construction-photo-report1512821.
410 Hodges, supra note 385.
411 See id.
412 Id.
402
403
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examining the consequences of that decision. Initially, the Executive
Council of the Brazilian Olympic Committee (BOC) conducted a
technical analysis to evaluate the conditions of Rio de Janeiro as a viable
city to host the 2016 Summer Olympics, whose findings were then
incorporated into the analysis of the International Olympic Committee
(IOC). 413 With the support of the Brazilian government and the Mayor
of Rio de Janeiro, the BOC nominated the city to host the 2016 Summer
Olympics. 414
Rio’s bid was considered by the IOC based upon the BOC’s
application file as well as a technical analysis by the IOC’s Evaluation
Commission on the City’s potential for staging successful Olympic
Games. 415 In selecting a host city, the Evaluation Commission’s 2016
report commended Rio’s strong government support, legal backing, and
public opinion. 416 The report outlined Rio de Janeiro’s biggest weakness
as a potential host city stemming from the recurrent issues of violence
potentially affecting the security and safety of holding Olympic
events. 417 The IOC’s concern for the safety of the events may have
encouraged Brazilian officials’ intensive police intrusion into many
favelas neighboring Rio de Janeiro. 418 Despite these security concerns,
the Brazilian government triumphantly celebrated when the IOC’s
Evaluation Commission selected Rio de Janeiro as the first city in South
America to host the Olympic games. 419 In preparation for the Olympic
events, Brazilian officials built and redeveloped many venues to meet
the demands of holding the festivities, many of which sat empty just
months later. 420

413 INT’L OLYMPIC COMM. CANDIDATURE ACCEPTANCE WORKING GRP., GAMES OF THE
XXXI OLYMPIAD 2016 WORKING GROUP REPORT (2008) [hereinafter 2016 OLYMPIAD REPORT],
https://stillmed.olympic.org/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/Documents/Host-CityElections/XXXI-Olympiad-2016/Working-Group-Report-for-the-Games-of-the-XXXIOlympiad-in-2016.pdf.
414 Anderson Gomes, COB Lança Candidatura do Rio para Olimpíadas de 2016, UOL
ESPORTE (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:24 AM), http://esporte.uol.com.br/outros/ultimas/2006/09/01/
ult807u851.jhtm.
415 2016 OLYMPIAD REPORT, supra note 413.
416 Id. at 20.
417 Id. at 78.
418 See Jonathan Watts, World Cup 2014: Rio’s Favela Pacification Turns into Slick
Operation, GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2013, 6:33 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
oct/07/2014-world-cup-rio-favela-pacification.
419 Juliet Macur, Rio Wins 2016 Olympics in a First for South America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/sports/03olympics.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.
420 Nancy Armour, Six Months After Olympics, Rio Is Falling Apart and the IOC Should
Have Seen It Coming, USA TODAY (Feb. 22, 2017, 8:28 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/columnist/nancy-armour/2017/02/21/rio-olympics-venues-disrepair-wasteland/
98220698.
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In 2007, FIFA, the world soccer body, announced that the 2014
FIFA World Cup tournament would be held in Brazil. 421 Upon
selection, government officials promised to redirect all public resources
to meet FIFA’s stadium requirements and to develop a city that can
handle the mass influx of event visitors. 422 Brazil’s planning of the 2014
World Cup was riddled with inefficiency and controversy from the
initial stage, which served to exacerbate the underlying social and
economic tensions. 423 While awarded the 2014 World Cup in 2007,
Brazil wasted almost two whole years in designating which cities would
host the games. 424 The vast infrastructure requirements dictated by FIFA
to the Brazilian authorities prompted the largest public display of anger
in the country in over twenty years. 425 The plans enacted by Brazilian
officials showed minimal concern for public opinion. 426 The priority of
constructing multi-billion dollar mega stadiums outweighed the need to
improve the underfunded hospitals and schools of a country replete
with slums. 427
To construct the necessary facilities, Brazilian officials violated the
rights of an estimated 250,000 residents by systematically removing
properties with force. These forced takings had little effect on the elite
and wealthy. 428 The exact count of those displaced is a fleeting
number. 429 The majority of favela residents affected by the takings had
spent generations maintaining and improving their properties, despite
having no legal protection to their land. 430
Vila Autódromo, a well-organized favela within the state of Rio de
Janeiro, has a well-documented history of organization and
421 Brazil Confirmed as 2014 Hosts, FIFA.COM (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.fifa.com/
worldcup/news/y=2007/m=10/news=brazil-confirmed-2014-hosts-625695.html.
422 Tariq Panja, FIFA’s $100 Million to Boost Brazil as World Cup Gift, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
10, 2014, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-11-10/fifa-s-100-millionto-boost-brazil-soccer-as-world-cup.
423 Arjyo Mitra, An Ethical Analysis of the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil, SEVEN PILLARS
INST. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/ethical-analysis-of-the-2014fifa-world-cup-brazil.
424 Andrew Downie, Brazil’s World Cup Protests Intensify as Country’s Politicians and FIFA
Squirm, TIME (June 21, 2013), http://world.time.com/2013/06/21/brazils-world-cup-protestsintensify-as-countrys-politicians-and-fifa-squirm.
425 Id.
426 See id.; see also Anderson Antunes, How the 2014 FIFA World Cup Became the Worst
Publicity Stunt in History, FORBES (May 27, 2014, 5:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
andersonantunes/2014/05/27/how-the-2014-fifa-world-cup-became-the-worse-publicity-stuntin-history/#4f52b7fc2b2f.
427 Downie, supra note 424.
428 See id.
429 At one point, it was believed that 30,000 people were relocated. Barney Ronay, World
Cup 2014: Brazil’s Horribly Invasive Footballing Trauma, GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2014, 2:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jan/02/world-cup-2014-brazil-football-trauma.
430 Anthony, supra note 66, at 362–63.
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development. 431 Local fishermen settled Vila Autódromo for its close
proximity to a nearby lagoon. 432 In the following couple of decades,
construction workers and other local migrants flocked to the expanding
community. 433 Despite the lack of government support, in 1987, the
community joined together to found an encompassing residents’
association to cultivate infrastructure such as water and electricity. 434 In
1992, the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro granted 354 households
a lease for the land for a thirty-three-year period. 435 The granted lease
was subsequently extended to ninety-nine years in 1994 by the governor
of Rio de Janeiro. 436 By 2005, as an additional security against
government evictions, Rio de Janeiro officials declared part of Vila
Autódromo to be a “Special Zone of Social Interest.” 437 The formal
nature of Rio officials’ various recognition of Vila Autódromo as a
legally occupied community suggests that the community was to be
protected from government removals.
However, the safeguards for which these residents fought
ultimately were obtained in vain because, in 2009, Rio officials began
discussion of relocating the residents of Vila Autódromo to
accommodate the necessary Olympic infrastructure. 438 Therein, the City
formally committed to the IOC a plan to connect competition venues
and existing transportation routes throughout Rio, now known as
TransOlímpica. The proposed route was designated to cut directly
through Vila Autódromo, despite countless other video projections
demonstrating that the planned expansion of travel routes could have
spared or upgraded the community to comply with the Olympic
infrastructure needs. 439 Fabricio Leal de Oliveira, an urban planning
431 See, e.g., Catherine Osborn, Vila Autódromo Unites in Protest Following Weeks of
Pressure, RIOONWATCH (July 23, 2013), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=10496.
432 M. Warburg Sørensen, Mega Events in Rio de Janeiro—The Case of Vila Autódromo:
Community Planning as Resistance to Forced Evictions 30 (2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis,
Roskilde University), http://www.academia.edu/3005429/Mega_Events_in_Rio_de_Janeiro__
The_Case_of_Vila_Aut%C3%B3dromo_Community_Planning_as_Resistance_to_Forced_
Evictions.
433 See Jo Griffin, Change Beckons for Vila Autódromo, the Favela that Got in the Rio
Olympics’ Way, GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2016, 7:38 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/2016/apr/26/rio-de-janeiro-favela-change-vila-autodromo-favela-olympics.
434 Veronique Dupont et al., Settlement Stories I: A Question of Knowledge?, in THE POLITICS
OF SLUMS IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH: URBAN INFORMALITY IN BRAZIL, INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA AND
PERU 79, 101 (Veronique Dupont et al. eds., 2016).
435 Lawrence Vale & Annemarie Gray, The Displacement Decathlon, PLACES J. (Apr. 2013),
https://placesjournal.org/article/the-displacement-decathlon.
436 Felicity Clarke, Vila Autódromo Unites Thousands in Landmark Demonstration,
RIOONWATCH (June 29, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=4141.
437 Vale & Gray, supra note 435.
438 Id.
439 See Luke Milner, Rio’s Olympic Legacy and Vila Autódromo, RIO TIMES (Mar. 6, 2012),
http://riotimesonline.com/brazil-news/rio-politics/rios-olympic-legacy-and-vila-autodromo.
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professor from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, explained that
Vila Autódromo had “favorable conditions for upgrading,” unlike the
challenges many other Rio favelas would present. 440 Oliveira went on to
distinguish Vila Autódromo from the majority of other Rio de Janeiro
favelas: “Normally favelas are narrower and denser with smaller plots,
which is much more difficult to upgrade. Here the plots are relatively
regular. . . . If the City wanted, they’d have urbanized this a long time
ago.” 441 The environmental characteristics of Vila Autódromo are
consistent with those of the adjacent, upscale neighborhood of Barra da
Tijuca, with defined roads, plots, and well-built structures. 442 Ultimately,
Rio de Janeiro’s assertion that the demolition of Vila Autódromo was
necessary to construct the Olympic infrastructure proved deceitful and
inaccurate. 443
The City’s strong intent to displace Vila Autódromo became
evident, as resident and activist Jane Nascimento de Oliveira stated that
she first learned of plans for her community’s removal through a
television broadcast by Rio’s mayor, Eduardo Paes. 444 Paes explained,
through media proxy, that the land leases to Vila Autódromo instated in
1994 by former governor Leonel de Moura Brizola were not legally
recognized under his administration. 445 Paes went on to arbitrarily
denounce the 1994 documents provided to Vila Autódromo residents as
inconsequential “little [pieces of] paper.”446 Thereafter, the City took
action to revoke the community’s Special Zone of Social Interest status
to bolster the logic behind resettlement. 447 Rio de Janeiro officials
explicitly nullified property leases legally issued under a previous City
administration to ease the City’s ability to satisfy Olympic contracts. 448
In March 2010, in response to the stringent actions taken by
officials, Vila Autódromo community representatives met with city
government officials, the state housing secretary, public defenders, and
activist groups in hopes of conciliation. 449 City officials sought to justify
440 Felicity Clarke, Vila Autódromo Creates Upgrading Plan in Fight Against Olympic
Eviction, RIOONWATCH (July 26, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=4405.
441 Id.
442 See Luísa Cortés, Plano de Urbanização para a Vila Autódromo, no Rio de Janeiro, é
Apresentado, INFRAESTRUTURA (Mar. 31, 2016), http://infraestruturaurbana.pini.com.br/
solucoes-tecnicas/urbanismo/plano-de-urbanizacao-para-a-vila-autodromo-no-rio-de-3700491.aspx.
443 See Watts, supra note 9.
444 Andréia Coutinho et al., Jane’s Awakening, RIOONWATCH (June 10, 2011), http://
www.rioonwatch.org/?p=1290.
445 Id.
446 Id.
447 Vale & Grey, supra note 435.
448 Id.
449 Id.
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the City’s plan for resettlement by diverting the blame to the IOC,
suggesting that the IOC designated the demolition of Vila Autódromo
as necessary. 450 City officials continued to justify the demolition of Vila
Autódromo with various, fluctuating reasons. The City later introduced
a new rationale, suggesting that safer conditions needed to be secured
for the new Olympic structures. 451 The different safety concerns asserted
alternated between prioritizing the safety for Vila Autódromo residents,
and community safety from these same residents. 452 City officials argued
that Vila Autódromo posed an environmental risk and must be
relocated. 453 In response to the inconsistent rationales provided by the
City, residents and community supporters unified in front of the Rio de
Janeiro City Hall to ask for both formal documentation and clearer
description of the presented environmental claims. 454
In October 2011, based on information provided by City officials,
the Rio newspaper O Globo reported that Vila Autódromo would be
removed in whole by 2013. 455 According to Theresa Williamson, 456 the
City employed a typical method of intimidation by using the local
newspaper to first announce the plans for forced removals of Vila
Autódromo, prior to the plans even being finalized. 457 Williamson went
on to specify that residents threatened with relocation had to be offered
three options by municipal law: monetary compensation, nearby
housing, or assisted purchase, stipulating that there should be “no
removal of established communities” unless the area presents a crucial
risk to the population. 458
The community support of Vila Autódromo, along with strong
resident activism against city officials, strengthened the community’s
efforts to fight back. 459 Throughout 2012, Vila Autódromo consistently
unified to combat the power of the City’s redevelopment plans. 460 The
Id.
Id.
452 Id.
453 Ellen Marrone, A Public Defense of Rio’s Public Defenders, RIOONWATCH (Mar. 6, 2011),
http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=739.
454 Vale & Gray, supra note 435.
455 Id.
456 Theresa Williamson is a City Planner and Executive Director of the activist network
Catalytic Communities, which has been closely following the Vila Autódromo case. See Theresa
Williamson’s Bio, CATCOMM.ORG, http://catcomm.org/theresa-williamson (last visited Apr. 30,
2017).
457 Vale & Gray, supra note 435.
458 Theresa Williamson, Opinion, Resettlement Cannot Represent a Step Backwards in the
Development of Communities, RIOONWATCH (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=
5577.
459 See generally Sørensen, supra note 432.
460 Lia Timson, Rio’s Vila Autodromo, the Other Olympic Legacy, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD
(Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.smh.com.au/sport/olympics/rio-2016/rios-vila-autodromo-the450
451
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Vila Autódromo residents’ association organized the community to
educate residents about their rights and undermine the government’s
intimidation tactics. 461 The turmoil of Vila Autódromo gained national
attention when activists shot a video filming government officials
intimidating residents during a “registration for relocation” drive, a
formal process mandated when people hold legal property claims. 462
The efforts of community activists proved beneficial, as Vila
Autódromo gained legal advisors and additional resources to fight the
government’s circumvention of the legal requirements. 463 The residents’
association collaborated with public defenders to record community
members who wished to stay in Vila Autódromo by conducting doorto-door interviews to amass a community census and inform residents
of their rights. 464 The community census confirmed that among the
approximately 720 families owning homes in the community, well over
half of the families affirmed their wish to remain. 465 This activism
proved critical as it prevented city officials from being able to argue that
a majority of Vila Autódromo residents wanted to leave, a standard
tactic in forced removal regimes.
B.

To Title or Not to Title?

The dramatic way in which the Brazilian government has treated
citizens during removals to make way for facilities for the World Cup
and Olympics is illustrative of a larger principle, which is that even a
decently well-functioning informal property system puts politically
powerless individuals at the mercy of the government’s whims. While
the absence of title is not the only factor explaining the actions of the
Brazilian government toward its people, it contributes to the sense that
favela residents lack legitimacy and are thereby holders of privileges
rather than of rights. The informal property system allows residents to
get by on a daily basis and effectuate transfers, but their ability to invest
in their property and use it as collateral is diminished via the lack of
title. In his seminal work on the subject, Hernando de Soto argued that
property rights are a key component to the formation of capital and that
a titling system is crucial to allow individuals to secure property rights

other-olympic-legacy-20160813-gqrygm.html.
461 Vale & Gray, supra note 435.
462 Id.
463 See Timson, supra note 460.
464 Kate Steiker-Ginzberg, Vila Autódromo Under Pressure from City to Accept Resettlement
Housing, RIOONWATCH (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.rioonwatch.org/?p=7832.
465 Vale & Gray, supra note 435.
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and use land to secure loans. 466 Martha Nussbaum went a step further
and listed “[b]eing able to hold property (both land and movable
goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others” as
necessary conditions of “a life worthy of human dignity.” 467 Indeed, the
resentment of favela residents at not being treated like the inhabitants of
the asfalto 468 is palpable.
Rio de Janeiro’s experience with informal property rights shows
some of the limitations of the type of self-organization described most
famously in Robert Ellickson’s work, Order Without Law. 469 Informal
property systems have been criticized for a number of reasons over the
years, including their high propensity for triggering violence. 470
Certainly, the residents’ associations are not models of providers of due
process, and favela inhabitants lack significant recourse if they feel
wronged. Title is a prerequisite to accessing the courts both for interresident disputes and, more importantly, when the government seeks to
dispossess residents. 471 Brazil has specific laws in place for the exercise
of eminent domain on the asfalto. The laws delineate both the
conditions under which eminent domain can take place—which is only
in situations where the government can prove public utility or social
interest—and what constitutes fair compensation. 472 The way that favela
residents can access this compensation as a matter of right is through
the formalization of ownership, which requires access to the same
documentation as everyone else, mainly in the form of title. 473
In addition to favela inhabitants’ struggle with the government and
the cartório system, the residents’ associations have a vested interest in
466 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
467 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP 77–78 (2006).
468

Nowhere is this more evident than in the contrast between the favelas and affluent
paved areas of the city, described in the everyday language of Cariocas, as the
dichotomy morro/asfalto (hill/asphalt), a signifier everyone understands and uses to
navigate the complexity of divisions and lines of segregation that characterise Rio.
Sandra Jovchelovitch, Self, Community and Urban Frontiers in Rio de Janeiro, LSECITIES,
https://lsecities.net/media/objects/articles/self-community-and-urban-frontiers-in-rio-dejaneiro/en-gb (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
469 ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991).
470 See, e.g., Stephen Clowney, Rule of Flesh and Bone: The Dark Side of Informal Property
Rights, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 59.
471 Lee J. Alston et al., The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the
Brazilian Frontier, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 25, 28 (1996).
472 Lei No. 3.365, de 21 de Junho de 1941, D.O.U. de 18.7.1941.
473 See Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 33–34; see also Douglas, supra
note 8.
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keeping individual title out of the hands of the inhabitants. For example,
the Cada Familia program did not simply fail due to a lack of
government resources; rather the residents’ associations refused to
collaborate because it was neither in their financial nor their political
interest to do so. . . . [D]istribution of property title would have
eliminated their ability to parcel out new lots in the favela[, and]
[p]olitically, it would have weakened their role as the intermediary
between local residents and state power. 474

Nominally, the residents’ associations have at times opposed title due to
concerns about gentrification. 475 Even among those skeptical of the
importance of individual title, however, some have questioned the level
of gentrification likely to occur given that
[e]ven if the head of the household was able to move, it was unlikely
that he or she was able to afford to buy a space outside the favela that
was both large enough and close enough to the city to bring the
extended family along. The cost of such a move would be prohibitive
or mean giving up work. 476

To the extent that gentrification does occur, it is not all created equal.
For instance, some studies about gentrification in the United States
suggest that this effect does not cause widespread displacement and can
in fact motivate long-term residents to stay because the neighborhood
becomes more attractive. 477 At times, this will also involve the opening
of businesses that not only further blur the lines between the favelas and
the asfalto, but also offer employment opportunities for residents. It
stands to reason that investors in such businesses would find the
proposition of starting up in a favela more attractive if it came with the
reliability of title.
Certainly, at times the sales price increases inherent in
gentrification 478 may prove irresistible to residents pondering letting go
of their property. It is believed that pacification alone has raised real
estate prices in the beneficiary favelas by about forty to fifty percent. 479
The greater the price increases, however, the less unreasonable the
MCCANN, supra note 179, at 85.
Interview with Favela Residents, supra note 145, at 10–11, 57, 60.
476 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 234.
477 Lance Freeman, Opinion, Five Myths About Gentrification, WASH. POST (June 3, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-gentrification/2016/06/03/
b6c80e56-1ba5-11e6-8c7b-6931e66333e7_story.html.
478 Chris Arsenault, Rio’s ‘Favela Chic’ Phenomenon Could Price Slum Residents out of Their
Homes, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 15, 2016, 12:17 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-favela-chicwill-price-us-out-of-our-homes-rios-slum-residents-speak-out-2016-8.
479 Steele, supra note 369; see also Chris Arsenault, Meet the Brazilian Man Who Sells
Property Nobody Owns, REUTERS (May 18, 2016, 9:19 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/usbrazil-landrights-idUSKCN0Y91R0.
474
475
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decision to sell may represent. This may be especially true for specific
segments of the population. For example, the elderly may no longer
need to remain located as closely to places of employment and could be
benefitted by receiving large lump sum payments that allow them to
retire earlier or under better conditions, albeit in a neighborhood farther
away from the center. The effects of individual title in Rio de Janeiro will
have differential consequences just like it does in countries that already
possess formalized property systems such as the United States.
It is the case that titling alone does not resolve the problem of
lagging economic development. One recent empirical study focused on
Peru questioned de Soto’s conclusions about the use of land title as a
means to secure property rights, though it appears that part of the
problem may have consisted of the fact that the titling in question
lacked appropriate enforcement mechanisms. 480 Some have also
questioned whether Rio de Janeiro’s favela inhabitants are actually
willing to take the risk of using their homes as collateral given the
uncertainties inherent in securing steady employment. 481 The usefulness
of title is thus potentially wrapped up in numerous other complications,
such as the lack of trust in many parts of the Brazilian government and
the widespread general economic uncertainty from which the country
suffers. One open question, as mentioned previously, is also to what
extent favela residents worry that the consequences of owning title will
involve paying property taxes. Some use the lack of title as a mechanism
not to pay taxes (whether because they cannot afford them or simply do
not wish to pay). 482 As described, residents would also become subject to
zoning regulations and building codes after acquiring title. 483 Eighty
percent of the favela residents that scholar Janice Perlman interviewed
stated that “they would like to have legal ownership of their property but
only if it did not mean incurring land taxes and service fees—especially
since they will still be excluded from the respect and urban amenities
enjoyed by other property owners in the city of Rio.” 484 Perlman
suggests a number of solutions to alleviate this problem, including

480 Claudia R. Williamson, The Two Sides of de Soto: Property Rights, Land Titling, and
Development, in 2 THE ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE WEALTH AND WELL-BEING OF NATIONS
2009–2010, at 95 (Emily Chamlee-Wright & Jennifer Kodi eds., 2010); see also Claudia R.
Williamson & Carrie B. Kerekes, Securing Private Property: Formal Versus Informal
Institutions, 54 J.L. & ECON. 537, 564 (2011) (arguing that the role of informal institutions has
been underestimated and that the costs of formal institutions have at times been neglected).
481 PERLMAN, FAVELA, supra note 24, at 300.
482 Id. at 297.
483 See id.
484 Id.
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giving a grace period for property taxes and ensuring that favela
residents receive the same package of services as the rest of the city. 485
On balance, the problems with lack of title and the current attitude
of the Brazilian government toward favela residents suggest the need for
improved mechanisms to obtain the individual title to which the
residents have a legal right. The first step is the drastic lowering of the
price and bureaucratic hurdles inherent in regularization. The second is
a showing on the part of the government that enforcement mechanisms
will actually accompany the implementation of title. The third is an
educational campaign, along with potential legal change to ensure that
the acquisition of title does not come with exorbitant property taxes that
continue to encourage favela residents to remain in the shadows.
CONCLUSION
No one solution will fix Brazil’s many economic, political, and
social problems. Integrating the vast proportion of the population living
in the favelas, however, is an important step toward a stabler and betterfunctioning society. Awarding title to individuals in the favelas will
encourage equality between the residents of different parts of Rio de
Janeiro and may lower some of the resentment that has built over many
years. It would give the residents access to the courts in the case of
property disputes. More importantly, it would diminish the
government’s ability to engage in property takings without disbursing
appropriate compensation. Rather than being a privilege whose level
remains at the discretion of the State, compensation would become a
full-fledged right of favela residents and may disincentivize the
government from exercising the power of eminent domain unless
absolutely necessary. The case-by-case political process when it comes
to removals has already exposed its inability to protect the most
vulnerable segments of Rio’s society. Awarding title would effectuate in
law what is already the case de facto: show that favela residents have
been the long-time owners and stewards of their property. It would
encourage investments into the bettering of property and enhance the
sense of security of the populace. And it would help to ensure that more
than five interlocked rings stand between spending dozens of years in a
community and being ripped out of it by force.

485

Id.

